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Nature exists as an objective reality on which human beings rely physically 
and spiritually. We are part of nature. But throughout human and 
environmental history 'nature' has also existed as a human idea and cultural 
construct. We project our values, fears, and aspirations onto our environment 
so that in nature we see a reflection of our own historical development and 
social existence. Our different class, cultural, and gender life experiences 
generate different attitudes towards our natural environment. For the most 
part we regard the ideas and attitudes towards nature as natural, and not as 
ideological constructions. 
Dominant techno centric and ecocentric discourses within contemporary 
environmentalism unselfcritically regard nature as a commodity and as a 
moral authority respectively. These alienated and romanticised views of 
nature reflect our contemporary estrangement from the natural world that we 
are part of Marx's dialectical materialism provides the analytical tools to 
critique the human/nature dualism expressed by technocentrism and 











perspective on the changing relations between humans and' their natural 
environment. 
As humans we are also apart from nature. We have a unique capacity to 
stand aside and consciously shape our relation with nature, albeit within the 
constraints and possibilities offered by ecological processes. How we define 
that relationship is for the most part determined by our own human 
economic, social, and political relations. This thesis argues that our 
contemporary alienation from, and abuse of, nature emerges out of the 
development of capitalist economic and social relations and the ethic and 
practice of the private ownership of natural resources. 
Ironically, it is the most alienated and impoverished sector of human society 
that offers the most progressive perspective on reconciling humans with 
nature. The struggles of urban and rural working class and poor communities 
for environmental justice integrates social, economic, political, and 
ecological issues in a way that poses a radical challenge to the alienated 
dualism of mainstream environmentalism. This thesis explores and 
highlights the progressive possibilities that the 'environmental justice 
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The interaction of human beings with their natural environment is as old as human 
history itself. Just as the course of human socia,4 Cultura4 and economic development has 
been enabled, constrained, and shaped by varied and changing biophysical conditions, so 
human society has impacted on and modified the natural environment on which it 
depends. Even primitive people, who "lived lightly upon the land," manipulated the 
natural resources and ecosystems around them (Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 3). In the 
Middle Stone Age for example, hunters and gatherers in the south-western region of 
South Africa discovered that by burning the fYnbos vegetation they could encourage the 
growth of bulbous plants which provided them with an important food source (Cowling 
and Richardson, 1995: 113). In our contemporary world it is probably impossible to find 
any part of the natural environment that has not been modified by human intervention 
(Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 3). Humans are unique in being able to stand apart from 
nature and transform it dramatically to meet their socially defined needs, unlike other 
animal species whose impact on their natural environment is tempered by their being an 
integral part of their ecosystems. 
Over the last half century the accumulated negative impact of human activity on the 
natural environment has become more and more apparent (Gare, 1995:73). The 
contemporary global environmental (or ecological) crisis embraces natural resource 
depletion, pollution of land, sea, and air, and the destruction of ecological processes and 











of this crisis such as global warming, desertification, and the depletion of the ozone layer 
can be characterised as part of a long-tenn chronic illness. On the other hand, we have a 
more immediate and direct experience of our degradation of the environment, through the 
acute destructive impact that our exploitation of natural resources and our disposal of 
pollutants have on the ecological systems that sustain life on our planet. These two levels 
of negative human impact are closely connected. The burning of vegetation in a particular 
area may not only impact on local biodiversity and encourage soil erosion, but the release 
of carbon dioxide contributes to the greenhouse effect and its systemic impact on global 
climate patterns (Goudie and Viles, 1997: 10-11). 
This thesis is not so much concerned with an examination of the negative effects of 
human economic activity on our natural environment as it is with exploring some of the 
dominant social responses to the ecological crisis. It seeks to do this primarily at a 
philosophical level, insofar as I argue that it is through our socially and culturally 
constructed concepts of both nature and our relationship with nature that we shape our 
frameworks for environmental action. 
This thesis critically explores two broad and dominant responses to the contemporary 
ecological crisis within the environmental movemen{ The two perspectives that I focus 
on are that of techno centric mainstream environmentalism, which embraces 
environmental economics and environmental reformism, and that of the more radical 
ecocentric deep ecologistsii. The thrust of my analysis critiques the philosophical 











policy and practice of these two perspectives. My critique is informed primarily by a 
Marxist philosophical perspective and by the conceptualisation that Marx developed of 
, the relations of humans to nature in his early writings. iii 
I argue that both the technocentric and ecocentric perspectives are philosophical 
expressions of our contemporary social alienationiv from nature. As such, they are ill-
equipped to challenge fundamentally our abuse of our natural environment, since that 
abuse is a feature of that same condition of estrangement. It is necessary that we reach 
beyond a worldview that is part of the problem in order to confront that problem. The 
frrst step in this direction is to become aware that our thoughts about nature and our 
relation to it might not be simply 'true', but might well be an expression of specific social 
and cultural experiences and interests - experiences and interests which are bound up 
with our socio-economic, and hence, environmental practices. This thesis seeks, at least, 
to encourage some degree of philosophical self-criticism. 
Environmental economics and environmental reformism regard nature as a thing to be 
valued monetarily, utilised economically, and managed practically, but do not question 
the structure of social, political, and economic relations through which we regard nature 
in this instrumental way. While this utilitarian view might acknowledge that primitive 
people had a different relation to nature or that to Eastern wisdom such a human/nature 
dualism is inconceivable, the arrogance of scientific rationality tends to regard these 
views as historical curiosities in relation to its own superior access to 'truth'. This is an 











form of a relationship that human society and culture have constructed (in this case our 
utilitarian regard for nature) is assumed to be an objective unchangeable reality, dictated 
by nature (Soper, 1996: 85-7). 
Ecocentric perspectives, expressed most clearly by deep ecology, likewise set up a 
duality - an image of a pure nature separate from profane humanity; a nature to be valued 
intrinsically rather than economically. This expression of alienation reifies nature, and 
projects human moral values onto nature (such as harmony and balance) which it then 
presents as the objective laws of nature according to which human society should 
organise itself (Dickens, 1992: 84; Grundmann, 1991). 
This alienated thinking is by no means peculiar to discourses within the environmental 
movement. It is rather an expression of a wider popular, scientific, philosophical, and 
religious tradition that characterises Western thought. Dualistic, rational, linear, and 
mechanistic thinking has its origins in the Hebraic separation of spiritual life and physical 
existence, and in the Greek elevation of reason over the more intuitive and instinctive 
capacities of human beings (Barrett, 1996: ix). The essential, and debilitating, feature of 
this worldview is that it cannot handle contradiction. It strives to resolve contradiction or 
establish a dualism rather than embrace a unity of opposites (Barret, 1996: ix). According 
to this mechanistic reasoning humans cannot be part-of-nature and apart-from-nature at 
the same time. Instead, it would argue, we have developed in a linear fashion out of the 
woods (so to speak) to conquer, tame, dominate, exploit, utilise, or manage nature, and 











In his early philosophical writings, Marx explored the dynamic tension between the fact 
that humans are physically and spiritually both part·of-nature and apart· from-nature, and 
. he argued that a conscious appreciation of this contradictory and dynamic unity was 
essential for the full realisation of human social potential (parsons, 1977). Marx argued 
that our contemporary emotional and spiritual detachment from nature, as a result of our 
turning nature into a commodity, is as much a measure of the alienation of human society 
from its real human nature as it is a mark of progress (parsons, 1977). Similarly. although 
from an entirely different tradition, the ancient Chinese philosophy of Taoism regards 
Western estrangement from nature as contrary to the unity of life's processes (Watts, 
1975: 37-55). This more holistic and dynamic perspective on the relation between 
humans and nature is also emerging forcefully within contemporary ecological theory 
(Capra, 1996). 
The general philosophic problem in both the technocentric and ecocentric perspectives is 
their inability to critically appreciate their own social constructions of nature and their 
assumption that those constructions are reality. By virtue of its very physicality, and 
through our largely empirical regard for our natural environment, the non·human life 
around us appears to be an uncomplicated reality. Our very understanding of the word 
'nature' carries with it the suggestion of essence, of a naturalness that is uncontaminated 











But consider for a moment how profoundly human our ideas of nature are and how 
loaded these ideas are with cultural symbolism. Nature is pure and sacred for some, while 
it is hostile and savage for others. Nature is sometimes seen simply as a commodity, 
sometimes as a moral authority, as an avenging force of destruction, or as a wilderness to 
be tamed and dominated (Cronon, 1995: 36-50). Even the notion that nature is one thing, 
a universal reality" is very specific to contemporary Western culture (Cronon, 1995: 51). 
We imbue this objective reality with human values and meaning - values and meaning 
that are not shaped by nature but by humans, i.e. by our historical, cultural, class, and 
gender experiences of our environment. What is a source of profit for some may be a 
spiritual experience for others. What has recreational value for those who can afford it 
may be a source of hardship for others. 
One of the most ironic expressions of the unnaturalness of our conception of nature can 
be found in the efforts of the Nature Company to market 'authentic' nature goods (price, 
1995). Within the vast American shopping malls it creates a virtual reality of 
'naturalness' - music, soft colours, flowing water - that appeals directly to the yearnings 
of consumers for authenticity. Nature here, has lost its real physical place; and through 
simulation has become a set of abstractions, symbo Is, moods, and emotions (price, 1995: 
186-198). As Cronon argues, 
'nature' is not nearly so natural as it seems. Instead, it is a profoundly human 
construction. This is not to say that the non-human world is somehow unreal or a 
mere figment of our imaginations - far from it. But the way we describe and 
understand that world is so entangled with our own values and assumptions that 
the two can never be fully separated. What we mean when we use the word 
'nature' says as much about ourselves as about the things we label with the word 











This philosophical critique may be regarded as purely academic, and even as 
undermining of the necessary practical task of getting on with saving the environment 
from human abuse. But the practical task - the policies and actions of various 
environmental perspectives - is informed by the ideas of what nature is and how humans 
should relate to it. The practical politics of environmentalism is directly informed by 
conscious or unconscious philosophy. 
Environmental econonncs, with its conception of nature as a commodity, sees the 
privatisation of nature as the route along which human society will come to properly 
value its natural resources and environment. Environmental reformism seeks 
environmental protection within the existing political and economic status quo and does 
not queStion free market capitalism as the framework that determines our social relations, 
our relation to our natural environment, and our very conception of nature. Deep ecology 
appeals to individuals to change their attitudes and lifestyle in accordance with the values 
that it projects onto nature, but does not really challenge the social and economic 
relations that determine people's lifestyles and attitudes towards their environment. This 
thesis argues that far from being a distraction from the real task, a self-critical analysis of 
environmental is essential. v In the words of Cronon: 
At a time when threats to the environment have never been greater, it may be 
tempting to believe that people need to be mounting the barricades rather than 
asking abstract questions about the human place in nature. Yet without 
confronting such questions, it will be hard to know which barricades to mount, 
and harder still to persuade large numbers of people to mount them with us. To 
protect the nature that is all around us, we must think long and hard about the 











Where specifically does this thesis take this critique? In arguing that our ideas of nature 
are social and cultural constructions, my aim is not to advocate the extreme 
postmodernist argument that the only truth we can know is that which is in our heads and 
that our discourses bear no relation to real processes in the natural world (Dickens, 1996: 
71). Whatever language and concepts we may choose to use, there is an objective world 
with which we engage .. The distinction that we make conceptually between a pet dog and 
a poisonous snake has a real meaning for our behaviour and has a real impact on our lives· 
and on the animaJs concerned. 
What is important to explore is the changing, approximating, dialectical relation between 
our subjective appreciation and experience of the world and objective reality itself vi. A 
crucial component of the process of developing our knowledge of the world around us is 
that we recognise our SUbjective involvement. As Capra argues, "what we observe is not 
nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning" (Capra, 1996: 40). We 
cannot assume that our perception and interpretation of the world gives us untainted facts. 
Only by recognising and celebrating the human values that are integral to our knowledge 
and behaviour can we develop the self-criticism that is essential to action in the world 
that is not simply informed by blind ideology (Soper, 1981: 26). 
Once we accept that our conception of nature and our relation to it is as much cultural as 
it is shaped by what nature objectively offers, then we can more honestly contest 











want human society to have with its natural environment. Such a struggle is not possible 
as long as we invoke nature as some natural moral authority or as a set of uncomplicated 
facts (Crono~ 1995: 52). And it is only through that human struggle that we can hope to 
give an environmentally sound meaning to our ability to stand apart from nature and 
impact on it so dramatically. This requires that we develop a vision that is as much about 
human aspirations, needs, and values, as it about advancing our understanding of the 
possibilities and constraints that nature offers us (Crono~ 1995: 21). My critique of the 
alienation expressed by Western dualistic philosophy is premised on the need to develop 
an environmental ethic that moves away from the strict choice between an 
anthropocentric (human-centred) and ecocentric (nature-centred) ethics, and that seeks 
instead to dynamically embrace both progressive human values and ecological wisdom. vii 
This thesis makes use of a Marxist perspective in offering a critique of techno centric 
environmentalism and deep ecology. Chapter 1 is devoted to outlining the main features 
of Marxist work within the field of ecology and environmentalism and to establishing the 
epistemological principles of a Marxist perspective. Chapter 2 argues for the significance 
of Marx's dialectical materialism in the study of ecology and explores in some detail 
Marx's arguments regarding humans in relation to nature. My particular emphasis here is 
on Marx's concept of alienation as the condition that has given rise to our contemporary 
estrangement from nature. 
It is the philosophical perspectives that arise out of this condition of human alienation 











environmentalism that I critique in Chapters 3 and 4. Without negating the positive 
contributions that both environmental reformism and deep ecology have made to the 
protection of our natural environment and to our understanding of ecological processes, 
my intention in these chapters is to encourage environmentalists to critically question the 
naturalness of their conceptions of nature and the environmental politics that flow from 
those conceptions. 
Chapter 5 explores the perspective of environmental justice that is rooted in the struggles 
of the impoverished and oppressed majority of humankind for access to natural resources 
and for improved conditions to their immediate environment. It is a perspective that 
integrates environmental issues with economic, political, and social justice struggles, and 
thereby, contrary to dominant dualistic Western environmental thinking, approaches 
nature as a humanised space and experience rather than as a commodity or a 
dehumanised pristine wilderness. Chapter 6 offers 11 case study of the emergence of an 
environmental justice movement in South Africa in order to highlight the challenge that 
these grassroots environmental struggles present to mainstream environmentalism. 
In Chapter 7 I return to the broad theoretical propositions regarding human-nature 
relations offered by Marx's dialectical materialism in order to connect them to the 











Notes to Introduction: 
In this thesis I use the term 'environmental movement' (and, alternatively, 
'environmentalism') to refer to the wide range of organised activities that have developed 
internationally over the last half century in response to the negative impact of human 
activities on our natural environment. While the term 'green movement' is often used 
(pepper, 1993) to refer to the dominant North American and Western European tradition 
within environmentalism, it is important that the emergence of an 'environmentalism of 
the poor' (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1996) in underdeveloped countries, and the 
'environmental justice movement' in working class communities (De Chiro, 1995) are 
recognised as significant new thrusts of social and environmental struggle. 
ii O'Riordan (in Pepper, 1993: 34), identifies two broad traditions within environmental 
politics. Technocentric environmentalism embraces 'interventionists' who believe that 
nature is best manipulated by science, technology, and market forces, as well as 
'accommodationists' (reformists) such as environmental scientists, liberal politicians, 
reformist trade unions, and enlightened business. The accommodationists believe in the 
adaptability and reform of the existing political, economic, and social status quo, and 
look to regulation, accountable management, and impact assessment as the means to 
protect the environment. Ecocentric perspectives include the politics of the radical 
greens, anarchists, deep ecologists, ecosocialists, and ecofeminists. Central to their 
philosophy and politics is a belief in the rights of nature and the need for a co-evolution 
of humans and nature. While their politics is radical, it is often vague and it embraces 
principles of decentralisation, self-reliance, locality, appropriate technology, and small-
scale economic activity. The emergent traditions of 'environmentalism of the poor' and 
'environmental justice' cannot be neatly fitted into either of these two approaches 
although they may carry within them influences of either techno centrism or ecocentrism. 
iii An elaboration of Marxist philosophy and of Marx's writings on the relation between 
humans and nature is presented in Chapter 2. 
iv I am using alienation in two senses here. Firstly, I use it to refer to a general condition 
of separation, estrangement, and detachment. Secondly, I use it in the more specific 
Marxist sense of a condition which arises out of that estrangement where we reify a 
socially created object (such as money, or the market, or our idea of nature) by imagining 
that it has a power of its own over us. Alienation in both senses, is a condition of 
dehumanisation and disempowerment. 
v Callicot and Ames (1989: 1-2) argue that environmental philosophy must not be used as 
a branch of applied ethics which simply seeks to apply traditional philosophical 











alternative moral and philosophical principles. This, they argue, is necessary precisely 
because of the role that traditional Western philosophy has played in creating our 
ecological crisis. 
vi A discussion of the relation between human knowledge and objective reality is taken 
further in Chapter 1. 
vii Following Proctor (1995: 281) I understand ethics to mean values and morals that are 












MAKING USE OF A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE - MARXISM, 
ENVIRONMENTALISM, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
Before outlining Marx's philosophical perspective on the relations between humans and 
nature (Chapter 2) and offering a critique of mainstream environmental philosophy 
(Chapters 3 and 4), it is important to give some consideration to the Marxist tradition in 
environmental thinking, and to explore some of the epistemological principles of this 
tradition. 
1.1 THE MARXIST TRADITION IN ENVIRONMENTALISM 
One of the biggest obstacles to our holistic conceptualisation of the ecological problems 
facing the world is the legacy of division between the social and natural sciences, 
corresponding, as this does, to the long-standing duality established in Western culture, 
religion, and philosophy between human society and the rest of nature. Our alienated and 
instrumentalist view of nature has been functional to and reinforced by the utilitarian 
needs of capitalist economic development (Benton, 1991; Dickens, 1992; Soper, 1979). 
Attempts by either natural science or social science to append the concerns of the other to 
its epistemological framework, results either in biological reductionism or ecological 
idealism on the part of the natural sciences (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 135)i, or in a 
simple addition of 'the environment' to a list of pressing issues by social scientists. In 
contrast, the contribution of classical Marxism to a holistic conception of human-nature 
relations is perhaps unparalleled in modem Western philosophy.ii Marx and Engels 











between humans and nature was established as the foundation for understanding the 
changing historical nature of this relationship (Dickens, 1992: 81). 
Aside from the contribution made by Marx's early writings to a general philosophical 
understanding of the relation between humans and nature, Marx and Engels offered a 
critique of "capitalist pollution and the ruination of nature." This critique dealt with such 
issues as society's failure to make productive use of waste products, the negative impact 
of commercial agriculture on soil fertility, the ecologically destructive effects of· 
deforestation, the harm caused by industrial pollution to workers' health, and the 
tendency of capitalism to ignore its harmful impact on nature (Parsons, ,1977: 169-206). 
The insight that Marx and Engels developed into the dynamic relation between social and 
ecological processes has not often been drawn upon by environmental and ecological 
disciplines (Benton, 1979).iii It is also unlikely that many environmental managers or 
planners in the West are even aware of the revolutionary attempts to integrate ecological 
principles and practice into economic planning in the early Soviet Union. iv 
The first and possibly major contemporary resistance to exploring Marx's contribution to 
environmental thinking arises out of the common equation of Marxism with Stalinist 
socialism (Burbach, 1996: 36; Soper, 1996: 82). The severe damage inflicted on the 
natural environment by the Stalinist states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seems 
to provide obvious testimony of Marxism's alleged indifference towards nature. It is 











casual equation with Stalinism, but it is necessary to assert and explore' the difference 
between Marx's dialectical materialismv as a dynamic guiding science and self-critical 
, practice on the one hand, and the Stalinist use of Marxism as a dogmatic ideology on the 
other (peet, 1992: 126). I discuss the epistemological differences between Marx's 
dialectical materialism and Stalin's positivism in the next section of this chapter. 
The second important resistance to making use of Marx's thinking on environmental 
issues is drawn from the charge that Marxism has never taken the relationship between 
human society and nature seriously and that Marx advocated limitless economic growth, 
with an unerring faith in technological progress and with little concern for the 
environment (Redclift, 1987). Marxism, it is argued, has always given priority to the 
development of the forces of production as the single measure of social progress (Soper, 
1996: 84). 
While it is certainly true that much of the Marxist tradition has taken hold of aspects of 
Marx's work to promote an unswerving productivism with little regard for the impact of 
economic development on ecological processes, and this is particularly true of Stalinist 
dogmatism, this draws undialectically and uncritically on particular aspects of Marx's 
theory. Marx's work reflects his own development within changing historical 
circumstances as well as a rich ambiguity that forms a characteristic feature of his 











While Marx's early writing was largely philosophical and devoted much sensitive 
attention to the relation between humans and nature, his later emphasis on a critique of 
capitalist political economy saw him shift into a more focused concern with social and 
economic development and with contemporary political issues (Dickens, 1992: 62). 
Marx's strong dispute with the Malthusian arguments about limits-to-nature was largely 
due to his opposition to the conservative politics that scarcity and overpopulation theories 
embraced in their disregard for the inequalities in consumption and distribution in 
capitalist society (Harvey, 1996: 146). Similarly, Marx's celebration of capitalist 
economic growth and technological advance must be understood in its historical context, 
and it needs to be set against the critical insight that he and Engels developed regarding 
. the negative ecological impact of capitalist development and the limits that nature 
imposes on human economic development (parsons, 1977). 
There is little to be gained by simply trying to defend or challenge what Marx said or 
didn't say at one time or another. Soper argues that the value and creativity of Marx's 
writings lie precisely in the epistemological tension created by coexisting and seemingly 
contradictory discourses in Marx's work (Soper, 1981: 35). To seek consistency and lack 
of contradiction in his writing is to move outside of the richness of his dialectical method. 
In constructing contradictions, such as in his simultaneous celebration of capitalist 
development and his condemnation of it, Marx embraced the complementary and 











Marx's work can be interpreted in an ecologically friendly way or in a technocratic way. 
It is up to us to give it the definition we want and to make use of it as we see fit in our 
contemporary circumstances (Soper 1996: 81). In advocating the value of dialectical 
materialism and Marxist philosophy for environmental science and ecology, it is 
unimportant to defend or justify the environmental track record of the Stalinist states. It 
would be more valuable in this regard to make use of Marx's analytic tools to critically 
understand and challenge that experience. It was in this way that Russian Bolsheviks in 
the 1920's developed a Marxist critique of Stalinism that has not been equalled in the 
subsequent eighty years. vi The case that I put forward for Marxism in this thesis is a case 
for Marx's method of dialectical materialism and is not concerned to defend the Stalinist 
political ideologies and practices that have emerged historically in the name of Marxism 
(Foster, 1999: 39), 
In spite of the resistance to making use of Marxist analysis in environmental and 
ecological theory, there has been a rich development and debate amongst Marxist and 
neo-Marxist writers on ecology and environmental issues ever since Enzenberger's 
Marxist political critique of the emerging environmental movement in the 1970's 
(Enzenberger, 1974) vii, According to Benton, these developments within Marxist 
environmentalism have followed four main avenues: attempts to develop a Marxist or 
. 
socialist normative framework in environmental philosophy; attempts to revise Marxist 
theory and concepts so as to provide explanations for capitalism's creation of ecological 
crises; an elaboration or redefinition of the socialist vision in order to include ecological 











socialist organisations (Benton, 1996: 104). It is with the ftrst of these areas - the 
contribution that Marxism can make to environmental philosophy - that this thesis is 
concerned. In this regard, I now outline two of the main issues within contemporary 
Marxist and post-Marxist environmental and ecological debate. I return to these issues at 
various points in this thesis. 
Firstly, within contemporary Marxist writings on ecology and environmentalism there is 
not just one interpretation of Marx's. perspective on the relation of human society to 
nature. Much of this has to do with the fact that it is possible to read Marx differently, as 
wehave already discussed. Regarding Marx's concern for nature, Marxists and neo-
Marxists point to a shift from his early humanist philosophical works, where he paid 
considerable attention to human-nature relations, to his later economic works, with their 
emphasis on social relations of production and a general celebration of economic 
progress. Marx's argument that humans are "part-of-nature", is for Marxist-naturalists 
(those with more ecocentric leanings) the correct reading of Marx, whereas Marxist-
humanists prefer his simultaneous assertion that humans are "apart-from-nature". Marxist 
environmentalists have attempted to explore this paradox in different ways, seeking to 
creatively develop an application of Marxist theory and method to our contemporary 
ecological challenges. This exploration is one of the central issues in contemporary 
attempts to develop a Marxist environmental philosophy. viii 
A second important area in Marxist philosophical and theoretical development is the 











narrative, its claims to trut~ and its alleged economic determinism, or reductionism. The 
valuable contribution that post-structuralists have made, with their emphasis on locality 
and difference in lived experience, does not, I argue, contradict the need for a universal 
narrative of struggle such as that offered by Marxism. My argument for such a collective 
vision, which I develop in Chapter 5, is not based on any totalising ideology that seeks to 
undermine differential experience, but emerges out of a recognition that differential . 
experience is embraced within a universal reality of inequality, oppression, and human 
and environmental degradation - the reality of the much celebrated globalisation of 
capitalism. Regarding challenges to Marxist claims to the truth and to its alleged 
economic reductionism, it is important to explore some of these epistemological issues 
immediately since they form part of the philosophical foundation of much of what is 
argued in the ensuing chapters. 
1.2 REALITY, KNOWLEDGE, AND ESSENTIALISM IN MARXIST 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
Given that the focus of this thesis is a critique of philosophical constructions of 'nature', 
it is important to give some general consideration to the relation between knowledge and 
reality, and in particular to outline the main features of Marxist epistemology. In this 
regard I wish to explore two issues, particularly in the light of post-modernist and post-
structuralist critiques of Marxism. The first relates to the Marxist epistemological claim 
that we can know the truth of the objective world (Castree, 1995: 31). The second is 
Marxism's claim that there are essential principles, laws, tendencies, processes, or 
structures that determine the framework of human existence, both physical and sociaL 











Marxism, knowledge, and reality 
Traditional Western scientific and philosophical thought, which provides the framework 
for mainstream environmental discourse, is a form of unqualified realism. Positivism, 
rationalism, and empiricism are essentially uncritical of the process of knowledge 
construction since they see our representations of reality as an uncomplicated reflection 
of the truth. The facts speak for themselves and our theoretical categories simply mimic 
the external world (Castree, 1995: 14). 
In contrast, Marxism and critical realism argue that theoretical knowledge is actively 
produced within a specific historical and cultural context (Castree, 1995). Knowledge is 
always constructed subjectively so that the representations that we abstract through our 
capacities, values, language, and interests are always relative approximations of objective 
reality. Drawing on neurobiological research, Hayles argues that knowledge is produced 
"at the cusp between the beholder and the world" with that world being an "unmediated 
flux" prior to our perception and interpretation of it (Hayles, 1995: 413). She explains 
that this conceptualisation 
acknowledges that every observation is contingent on the observer,· but also 
recognises that the unmediated flux plays an active role in informing and guiding 
perception. Reality originates at the interface where an organism capable of 
perception ... encounters the unmediated flux. Worlds come into being as a result 
of this interactivity. Not the observer alone, and not the unmediated flux alone, 
but the two together in dynamic interaction (Hayles, 1995: 418). 
Whenever we talk about nature we must recognise that we are referring simultaneously to 











between this reality and our knowledge of it is not neutral and uncomplicated (Castree, 
1995: 15). 
In contrast to Marxism and critical realism, post-modem deconstructionism argues that 
we cannot know any objective reality and that truth is entirely relative to a particular 
context or experience. Knowledge is purely subjective, made up of a set of signs, texts, 
and images and cannot claim to represent any reality beyond its own experience (Stabile, 
1995: 91; Quigley, 1992). Truth then cannot be derived from any epistemological 
correspondence to reality but is ''what comes to be believed in the course of free and open 
encounters" between different experiences and knowledges (Rorty, quoted in Peet, 1992: 
114).ix 
Marx's epistemological method - that of dialectical materialism - seeks to embrace the 
tension between human subjectivity and the objective world and between the truth and 
relativity of human knowledge. While there are arguments within the Marxist tradition 
that dialectical materialism is a simple statement about the nature of reality (Harvey, 
1996: 48), two important qualifications need to be made to this. The first is that dialectics 
recognises the elusive nature of reality - its complexity, fluidity; and impermanence - so 
that any attempt to capture the objective world in thought is going to require abstractions 
and distinctions which will always compromise the complexity of reality (Soper, 1979: 
62). The second is Marxism's recognition that our perception and interpretation of the 
world is itself a changing phenomenon, dialectically shaped by our experience. So while 











the world, its actual arguments must always be understood as approximations of reality. 
This tension between representation and reality is not static. Following Marx's 
conceptualisation of philosophy and theory as a constantly changing approximation of 
objective truth, Lenin argued: 
In the theory of knowledge, as in every other sphere of science, we must think 
dialectically, that is, we must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and 
unalterable, but must determine how knowledge emerges from ignorance, how 
incomplete knowledge becomes more complete and more exact (Lenin, 1977: 
240) .. 
It is this historical perspective on the relativity of the truth of human knowledge that 
really distinguishes dialectical materialism from the relativity of post-modernism. As 
Lenin explained, 
dialectics is not reducible to relativism, it recognises the relativity of all our 
knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense that the 
limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth are historically conditional 
(Lenin, 1977: 273). 
A further dimension to dialectical materialist epistemology is its recognition that humans, 
in their interaction with the material world around them, are active subjects in the 
creation of their knowledge. This is important in two senses. Firstly, it allows Marxism 
(as with critical realism) to be self-critical and reflexive about its process of knowledge 
construction and about the impact that its representations have in the world (Castree, 
1995: 37-39). Secondly, it allows Marxism to embrace an evaluative discourse within its 
pursuit of truth. Inasmuch as Marx's theories about human society arise out of a scientific 
analysis of history, they are at the same time charged with normative arguments about 
what is possible and desirable in the world. Positivism rejects this contamination of 











51~ Soper, 1981: 26). But what happens under the cover of this denial of subjectivity is 
that values get disguised and presented as facts. Western science and philosophy,as well 
as Stalin's inflexible iron laws of history, serve as ideologies for defending a status quo 
rather than inviting critical reflection as the basis for understanding and seeking 
transfonnation. 
Marxist essentialism 
As a materialist science, Marxism starts with the proposition that matter, or the objective 
existence of "things in themselves", is primary over all sensation and consciousness that 
arises by virtue of that existence (Lenin, 1977: 186). Humans are first of all part-of-
nature, an objective reality that fonns the pennanent ground and framework for all human 
activity (Soper, 1996: 270). It is on the basis of this material existence (humans as part-
of-nature) that all human sensation, thought, spirituality, and social and cultural activity 
(humans as apart-from-nature) becomes possible. It is out of necessity that human society 
organises a social labour process in order to ensure its own reproduction (Peet and Watts, 
1996: 260). How humans organise production strongly influences how they relate to one 
another socially and how they relate to nature (Pepper, 1993: 67). This material 
detennination, argues Marxism, is essential. It is a leading and determining principle 
necessary for the existence of human society. It is the framework in which the rich 
complexity of human social life is carried out (peet, 1992: 120). 
Post-structuralist critiques of Marxist essentialism are directed at three connected issues. 











human social existence can be analysed to reveal a single, in this case, economIC 
determination (Foster, 1999: 40; Resnick and Wolff 1992: 131). Secondly, it is argued 
that Marxism's economic reductionism is expressed in its '10talising" category of class -
an allegedly narrow economic identity that denies the validity of a range of other 
political, social, cultural, geographical, and religious identities that are prominent in 
people's experiences (Graham, 1992: 151). Thirdly, this alleged rigid determinism of 
Marxism is regarded as teleological insofar as it suggests that human history is governed 
by some grand design dictated by economic development (peet 1992: 120). 
There are four important points to make regarding Marxism's alleged economic 
determinism and reduction of all identity to that of the economic category of class,. 
Firstly, essentialism is not the same as a simple determinism or reductionism. Secondly, 
to argue for a basic framework of determination by what is essential is not to deny that 
any development can be shaped by othef factors. Thirdly, the Marxist category of the 
'economic' cannot be interpreted simply in technical terms, but must be seen as 
embracing the rich complexity of all social relations and processes that ensure material 
production and social reproduction. Lastly, while the category of class arises in relations 
of production, it is not a narrow economic identity that has to compete with other non-
economic identities. In what follows I address these four post-structuralist critiques of 
Marxism's essentialism. 
Essentialism and simplistic determination are not the same thing. Essentialism posits at a 











process. Marxism argues that physical and material production and reproduction is the 
necessary framework for human social existence. This is not to argue that the economic 
activity happens first and then everything else follows, or that every event and process in 
human development and history is therefore determined by economic factors. Through 
his emphasis on dialectical relations between things and processes and through the weight 
that he gave to political, cultural, and ideological factors in shaping the course of history, 
Marx developed an analytical framework that was decidedly not reductionist (Foster, 
1999: 40). What is determining at an essential structural level (the material necessity of 
production) does not deny or negate what can shape events at a more concrete 
experiential level (such as religious conflict or political struggle) (Peet, 1992: 122). 
Peet argues that there is nothing necessarily reductionist in a quest for the essential 
because '''essential aspects and structures are not the terminal points of theorising, but are 
indeed the 'entry points' to the multiple dimensions of reality" (Peet, 1992: 120). He goes 
on to elaborate: 
... social processes have similarities ... similar processes recur in time and space, 
and ... such recurrences are not accidental but the result of human beings carrying 
out activities essential for the reproduction of their existence ... Classical Marxism 
accords these reproductive structures a privileged position in life - that is, they 
make life possible ... While events have unique aspects, they are also parts of these 
ongoing processes of the reproduction of existence and are determined by their 
place in the structures formed by the reproductive relations and practices. An 
event happens in part because of necessity (reproduction) and in part because of 
circumstance (conditions peculiar to the event); Marxist theory explores the 
dialectical relations between reproductive necessity and freedom of action (Peet, 
1992: 122). 
The economic does not need to be narrowly and technically defined. It refers to broad 











themselves. This involves all kinds of complex social relations that do not neatly allow 
for a strict delineation between what is economic, political, social, cultural, or religious 
(Peet, 1992: 123). These abstractions are only useful if we are able to appreciate the rich 
dialectical relations and processes that constitute lived experience. 
In the same way it is not useful to distinguish class so categorically from experiences 
such as gender, culture, and locality, when it is precisely all those diverse and often 
conflicting experienced identities that make up the actual content of being in one class or 
another. While the concept of class is derived from relations of production and is 
therefore essential, it is neither a strictly economic category (since to identify anything as 
strictly economic is to abstract it from a complex reality), nor is it simplistic or 
reductionist in how class relations shape people's experiences (Stabile, 1995: 100). For 
example, the fact that a working class woman might also be black, a single mother, and 
Muslim, does not conflict with her class identity; rather it gives it specific content and 
meaning. x Marxism certainly seeks out commonality and universals but it also embraces 
the richness of uniqueness and variation. 
While Marxism does identify essential features in the human experience (such as the 
necessity for social reproduction) and emphasises specific historical tendencies (such as 
the tendency of capitalism to create its own crises), this does not necessarily imply that 
human history has any preordained course. The weight that Marx gave to the variable 
fortunes of class struggle as a shaper of history negates any suggestion of a deterministic 











dogmatic iron laws of history, Marx's dialectical materialism offers' an analytical 
framework "in . which a number of dynamic tendencies in shifting hierarchical 
. arrangements are constantly disturbed and dislocated by new sequences of different 
events, a dynamic which has pattern, order, and determination without being teleological" 
(peet and Watts, 1996: 38). 
While much of the epistemological engagement of post-structuralism with Marxism 
offers rich content to the framework of dialectical materialism, the sweeping dismissal of 
Marxism as reductionist, deterministic, and teleological is crude and simplistic. Positivist 
Marxism, best expressed by Stalinism, is indeed guilty of mechanically dividing the 
world into cause and effect, of setting up a strict base-superstructure determinism, and of 
confining analysis to the economic causes of events (Foster, 1999: 40; Peet, 1992: 116). 
But to bury the richness of dialectical materialism in the same coffin as Stalin is hardly a 
credit to post-structuralism's sensitivity to difference and variation. To dismiss Marxism 
as determinism and to equate dialectical materialism with Stalinist positivism is itself 
reductionist (Peet, 1992: 122). 
Marx's dialectical materialism should not be equated with the inflexible dogmatism of 
Stalinism. The capacity of dialectical materialism as a self-critical and reflexive 
epistemology to approximate the flux of objective reality gives it a particularly dynamic 
quality in two senses. Firstly, dialectical materialism is able to abstract and conceptualise 
from life-processes without negating the rich complexity, contradiction" and dynamism of 
those processes. Secondly, in appreciating the historical relativity of human knowledge 











world, Marxism recognises that the workings of human consciousness are not separate 
from the changing life·processes that we observe and analyse. Our ability to stand 
separate from nature is itself a natural act and subject to the same kinds of dynamic 
processes of change and development. 
In the following chapter I argue that Marx's dialectical materialism is profoundly useful 
for the study of ecological processes and relationships and in particular for our 
understanding of the changing relations between human society and its natural 
environment. Marx's analysis of humans in nature offers a contradictory unity which 
traditional Western philosophy cannot easily embrace. Marx suggested that essentially, 
metaphysically, and ecologically, humans are both part·of-nature andapart-from-nature. 
Historically this dynamic tension takes different forms, so that in contemporary capitalist 
society we have become alienated materially and spiritually from the nature on which we 
depend. This estrangement expresses itself in all human activities, and as I argue in 
Chapter 3 and 4, even finds expression in contemporary environmentalist philosophy 











Notes to Chapter 1: 
i I will elaborate on biological reductionism in Chapter 2 and on ecological idealism in 
Chapter 4. 
ii This is in contrast to much of Eastern wisdom which emphasises the unity of humans 
and nature (Barret, 1996; Callicot and Ames, 1989; Watts, 1996). 
iii Even the progressive ecological theorist, Capra makes no positive reference to the 
Marxist tradition in his exposition of "living systems theory" in his book the Web of Life 
(1996). 
iv Environmentalists in the early Soviet Union argued for the need to incorporate 
ecological principles into economic plans. As the First All-Russian Congress for the 
Conservation of Nature resolved in 1929: "The economic activity of man is always one 
form or another of the exploitation of natural resources... The distinction and tempo of 
economic growth can be correctly determined only after the detailed study of the 
environment and the evaluation of its production capacities with the aim of its 
conservation, development and enrichment. This is what conservation is all about" 
(quoted in Gare, 1995: 82). 
v In the 1840's Marx developed the epistemological method and philosophical 
perspective of dialectical materialism through his study and critique of Hegel's dialectics 
and the materialism of Feuerbach. Briefly put, this perspective claims that living matter 
and physical material existence is primary to sensations, thought, and consciousness 
(materialism), and that complexity, contradiction, relationship, and change are essential 
to all life processes and lie at the basis of all things that we might experience as discrete 
entities ( dialectics). A fuller exposition of dialectical materialism is given later in this 
chapter and in Chapter 2. 
vi I refer here mainly to the work of the Left Opposition, led by Leon Trotsky, who 
undertook Marxist critiques of the growth of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. 
vii The main Marxist and Post-Marxist works consulted here include those by Benton, 
1979, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996; Castree, 1995; Dickens, 1992, 1996; Foster, 
1995a, 1995b, 1998, 1999; Gare, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1994, 1995; Grundmann, 1991a, 
1991b; Harvey, 1989, 1992, 1996, 1998; Levins and Lewontin, 1985; O'Connor, 1997; 
Parsons, 1977; Peet, 1992; Peet and Watts, 1996; Pepper, 1993; Schmidt, 1971; Soper, 
1979, 1981, 1995, 1996; Vogel, 1988; and Watts, 1996. 












ix What is summarised here certainly does not do justice to the variation within post-
modernist and post-structuralist deconstructionist arguments about epistemology. There 
are extremely valuable arguments for privileged discourses and for the significance of 
experiential knowledge that Marxism certainly needs to draw from. The richness of this 
post.modernist contribution will be explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 












MARX ON THE RELATION 
BETWEEN HUMANS AND NATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a Marxist perspective on the essential relation between human 
society and nature and an understanding that this relation has taken different forms 
historicallyi. Essentially, Marx argued, the relation between humans and nature embraces 
a contradictory unity. While humans are integral to nature and dependent on it, they have 
at the same time an unusual independence (compared to other animal species) from their 
natural environment (Parsons, 1977: 135). 
This independence lies in the capacity of humans to stand separately from nature and to 
transform it to meet their socially defined needs. Human society has the ability to give a 
human shape and meaning to nature, albeit through a dynamic engagement with the 
objective constraints offered by natural processes (O'Connor, 1997: 52). Under the 
specific conditions of contemporary capitalism (and the same can be said of the recent 
experience of Stalinist socialism), this human capacity to shape our relation to nature has 
expressed itself through estrangement, utilitarianism, and extreme abuse, often 
consciously pushing beyond the limits of what is required to sustain life on earth. 
Marxism argues that this alienated behaviour is not an inevitable expression of human 











nature a form which human society can change (parsons, 1977: 17). It is the same 
capacity of human society to self-consciously construct its relation to its environment 
which, in contrast to our· present abuse, dialectically suggests possible new worlds that lie 
outside of our present experience (Harvey, 1996: 56). In the Marxist vision, there is the 
potential for human society to master its relationship with nature in an ecologically sound 
manner. This potential can only be realised through firstly, a dramatic reorganisation of 
our social relations, politically and economically, and consequently, the development of 
new ways of relating to nature materially and spiritually (Benton, 1993: 29~ Dickens, 
1992: 69). 
2.2 MARXIST DIALECTICS AND ECOLOGY 
The science of ecology, broadly understood to concern itself with the relations between 
living organisms (including humans) and their environments (Grundmann, 1991b), was 
first conceptualised by Ernst Haeckel in 1869 (Parsons, 1977: x). Some twenty years 
earlier, Marx formulated his materialist conception of history, in which he presented in 
broad sweep a profoundly ecological conception of the relation of human society to 
nature. ii A central feature of Marx's developing epistemology was his attempt to reflect 
the complexity, interconnections, dynamic movement, and historical change that is 
essential to all life-processes. This kind of approach, generally referred to as a "relational 
paradigm", is common to dialecticsiii, process philosophy (Gare, 1995), and living 











Benton argues that one of Marx's greatest contributions was his philosophical challenge 
to the mechanistic materialism that has long dominated Western science (Benton, 1979: 
.124). Western science's Cartesian philosophical perspective, out of which empiricism, 
positivism, and reductionism arose, is an expression of human alienation from nature, 
in which parts are separated from wholes and reified as things in themselves, 
causes separated from effects, subjects separated from objects ... (an) alienated 
world view (that) captures a particularly impoverished shadow of the actual 
relations among phenomena in the world (Levins and Lewontin, 1985: 269-71). 
In contrast to this mechanical vIew of the world it is useful to outline the mam 
propositions of Marxist dialectics. Although these are presented here as abstract 
principles, their application to an exploration of the relations between human society and 
nature is the substance of this thesis. The following is drawn with considerable reworking 
from Harvey (1996: 48-57) and Levins and Lewontin (1985: 272-85): 
• While our first experience of a plant is likely to be the thing itself, its existence as a 
dynamic form of life can only be grasped through an appreciation of its relation to the 
sun, earth, and water. Dialectical thinking gives ontological preference to processes 
and relations over things and elements, even if epistemologically we arrive at the 
former via our apprehension of the latter. 
• Any particular form of nature, be it plant or animal, needs to be understood in relation 
to the ecological system of which it forms a part. Likewise, an ecological system only 
exists by virtue of the interrelated forms of life that constitute it. Parts and wholes are 
mutually constitutive - each is essential to the definition, maintenance, and 
transformation of the other. The one cannot exist without the other. In Taoist 
philosophy this relationship is conceptualised as "mutual arising" (Watts, 1975: 43). 











which they relate to one another. In any context, parts and wholes have relative 
boundaries. 
• All living organisms experience the cycle of birth, transformation, and death. Their 
form of existence at any point in time is transitory. Elements or things emerge out of 
processes and relations within structured systems or wholes. Without denying relative 
permanence, dialectics emphasises matter as a product of motion and flux. Objects, 
things, and elements are constituted, sustained, transformed, and destroyed by the 
processes that define them. 
• ·While the lifespan and manifestation of a butterfly might be dramatically different to 
that of a mountain range, all living processes contain space and time as aspects of 
themselves that define their specific scales for development. 
• Living things and systems contain internal processes and characteristics which 
simultaneously support and undermine their unity. An acorn contains the capacity to 
become an oak tree, and the tree contains its own potential for growth, death, and 
decay. It is these internal contradictions, all the time influenced by external forces, 
that define the impermanence and instability of all living systems. 
• While life systems and processes might appear to be stable in the short term, a longer 
view of ecological processes reveals dynamic and often radical transformations. 
Order, balance, and stability are special situations, rather than the norm, and need to 
be accounted for. Systems of complexity tend to be dynamically unstable. 
• Transformative behaviour, or creativity, arises out of internal contradiction, making 
development and change an essential feature of life. In the process of change, subject 
and object, as well as cause and effect, can change places, so that the organism affects 











• This emphasis on the potential for transformation that arises out of instability, 
projects the concern of dialectical thought beyond just an analysis of what exists, in 
order to ask: Where is this process going and what is possible? 
There is a striking similarity between the propositions of dialectics and those of 
contemporary ecologicaJ thought, even though the latter has developed out of an entirely 
different scientific and philosophical tradition. In his book The Web of Life, Capra traces 
the development of contemporary ecological thought as the basis for "a new language for 
understanding the complex, highly integrative systems oflife ... (which) ... may be seen as 
the scientific forefront of the change of paradigms from a mechanistic to an ecological 
worldview" (Capra, 1996: x). With a more specific interpretation of the relation between 
the science of dialectics and that of ecology, Parsons argues: 
Ecology as a specific science of ecosystems displays the principles of the general 
science of nature, or dialectics. For dialectics as a science of systems generally is 
concerned with the interactions of two or more living or nonliving systems with 
one another and with their environment. Ecology is the application of dialectics to 
living systems, and dialectics is the generalisation of the method of ecology from 
living systems to all systems (parsons, 1977: 7). 
Having presented, in broad outline, the main propositions of dialectics as ecological 
theory, it is important to point to four specific dialectical themes which are relevant to the 
analysis of human-nature relations in the rest of this chapter: 
• Marxism understands humankind to be part-of-nature in the sense that humans are 
dependent on nature for their existence (humans as "natural beings"). At the same 
time Marxism sees the human species as being apart-from-nature by virtue of having 
an unusual capacity (compared to other species) to stand separately from nature and 











• Marxism· asserts that nature exists as an objective reality independent of human 
experience of it. At the same time it recognises that our conceptualisation of nature is 
all the time an historically determined social and cultural construction (Parsons, 1977: 
3; Soper, 1995: 249). 
• That humans are both part-of-nature and simultaneously apart-from-nature, is for 
Marxism an essential relation between humans and nature that exists regardless of 
historical expression and change in the form of this relationship (Benton, 1989: 589; 
Geras, 1983: 67). 
• Marxism explores and embraces the dialectical and dynamic relation between human 
society and nature. How human society impacts on nature not only changes the 
natural environment but in turn transforms humans and their attitude to nature so that 
they then intervene in nature in new ways. Subject and object, cause and effect are 
constantly changing places (Harvey, 1996: 26-7; Ollman, 1971: 105; Soper, 1996: 
89). 
• Like nature, human society is governed by processes of gradual evolution as well as 
sudden transformation. Such processes of change and development arise out of the 
interaction of internal political~ economic, and social forces. A crucial element within 
this dynamic of change and development is the capacity of humans to consciously 
shape the direction that they want social transformation to take. Within the 
possibilities and constraints offered by our present economic, social, and 
environmental reality, we have the capacity to decide what kind of society we want, 
what kind of nature we want, and how we want to relate to our natural environment. 
As dialectical themes, each of the above constitutes a tension or contradiction. This is not 
a contradiction in the sense of an incompatibility, but in the dialectical sense of "a union 











undermining each other" (OHman in Harvey, 1996: 52). These themes, while they relate 
directly to specific sections in the rest of this chapter, are arguments that run through the 
thesis as a whole. 
2.3 HUMANS AS PART-OF-NATURE AND APART-FROM-NATURE 
In his outline of the materialist conception of history, Marx sought· to locate human 
society in relation to nature and explored how this relationship changed historically 
(Geras, 1983: 61). As a materialist, Marx insisted that human beings, with all that is 
notable about them as a highly conscious species with a distinct social history, are 
"irredeemably rooted in a given biological condition; absolutely continuous with the rest 
of the natural world" (Geras, 1983: 97). 
In arguing that humans are natural-beings and that "human history is part of natural 
history" Marx meant two things. Firstly, he recognised that humans, as an evolved 
biological species, have basic requirements (needs, drives, wants) and powers (capacities 
and potentials) that are common to all forms of nature (Benton, 1993: 46-7; OHman, 
1971: 81-2). Secondly, like any other living organism, humans require objects outside of 
themselves, a natural environment, for the satisfaction of their needs and for the 
realisation of their powers and capacities (Ollman, 1971: 81-2; Schmidt, 1971: 314). 
Nature, Marx argued, was "indispensible to the manifestation and confirmation of man's 
(sic) essential powers". This, Marx argued, was not just a physical dependence, since 











thoughts (Parsons, 1977: 39) In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx 
described this human dependence on nature with profound ecological insight: 
Nature is man's (sic) inorganic body - nature, that is, insofar as it is not itself the 
human body_ Man lives on nature - means that nature is his body, with which he 
must remain in continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and 
spiritual life is linked to nature means that nature is linked to itself, for man is 
part-of-nature .... the fact that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective 
being and a force of nature, means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object 
of his being and the expression of his life, or that he can only express his life 
through real, sensuous objects ... a being which does not have its nature outside of 
itself is not a natural being and does not share in the being of nature (McLellan, 
1977: 81, 104r 
Although Marx and Engels argued that humans were first of all part-of-nature, they 
strongly opposed the reductive naturalism of the popular Social Darwinism of the 19th 
century. Social Darwinism, as well as more contemporary versions of biological 
reductionism, extrapolates directly from animal behaviour to interpret human nature and 
human social behaviour. This biological determinism has been used to justify all kinds of 
racist, nationalist, gender, and sexual oppression, and has claimed that property 
ownership and capitalist competition are simply the social expressions of an instinctive 
human nature. For the most part it involves a projection of human social prejudices onto 
animal behaviour (Benton, 1979: 134-6~ Soper, 1995: 60-1). 
For Marx and Engels, the assertion that humans are part-of-nature is immediately 
qualified by an equally strong claim that humans are simultaneously apart-from-nature. 
This species being of humanity, while it enables human society to set itself apart from the 
rest of nature, is itself natural, in that the powers of the human species arise out of the fact 











But man (sic) is not merely a natural being~ he is a human natural being. That is to 
say, he is a being for himself. Therefore he is a species being, and has to confirm 
and manifest himself as such both in his being and in his knowing (quoted in 
Parsons, 1977: 135). 
There are numerous ways in which Marx identified the species characteristics of humans 
- characteristics such as cognitive capacity, consciousness, language, use of tools, 
culture, emotions, and purposeful activity - which distinguished humans from other 
animals and from nature generally. While uniquely human claims to these capacities are 
today being challenged by ethological and ecological studies, this does not deny the fact 
of an obvious human distinctiveness (Benton, 1993: 46-50; Capra, 1996: 257-80). The 
capacity that the human species has for conscious activity, for purposefulness, for 
planning and regulation, for communication, for transcending necessity, goes far beyond 
the germ of consciousness that we can find in animals (Geras, 1983: 84)vi. 
It is through their particular species capacities that humans play an unusually determining 
role in defining their relation to nature. Humans are unique in their ability to utilise and 
transform nature in ways that push the boundaries of ecological constraints, and in their 
ability to both design and reflect on those interventions. This separates humans from even 
the most mindful and conscious non-human species and ecological processes. Whether 
we want to regard this as a matter of evolutionary degree or as a real qualitative 
distinction between humans and other animal species is not too important. What is 
important is that we recognise our capacity to impact consciously and wilfully on nature, 











Within the range of human attributes that are different from the powers of other species, 
there is a specific capacity that needs to be emphasised. This is the highly developed 
ability to be self-conscious, ie. the capacity of humans to reflect on what they do, value 
and critique it, and act again on the basis of that reflection (Soper, 1996: 88). It is on the 
basis of this ability of "man (sic) to make his life-activity itself the object of his will and 
of his consciousness" (Marx., quoted in Ollman, 1971: 112), that humans are able to plan 
and design, to make choice, to transcend necessity, and to transform their natural 
environment~ In this regard Marx and Engels emphasised: 
It is the unique power of men (sic) to think about their world and themselves, to 
act upon nature and social and political institutions and to change them ... for the 
fulfilment of their own capacities ... man is distinguished from the animals by his 
power to imagine the outcome of his possible action and then to realise his 
purpose through action (quoted in Parson, 1977: 137). 
It is the unity of natural and species characteristics, and indeed the tension and 
contradiction between them, that provides the basis for defining human nature. Marx 
argued that the human condition embraces the need and capacity of humans to shape and 
develop their relation to themselves and at the same time to intervene and mediate in their 
relation to nature (Geras, 1983: 83). While Marxism insists that human nature is only 
expressed concretely in specific forms through the process of history, the fact that 
humans have a history is made possible by their intrinsic constitution, their essential self-










2.4 HUMAN TRANSFORMATION OF NATURE 
F or Marx, human nature arises out of the unity and tension of humans as natural being 
and species being. Humankind is essentially and historically defined both by its evolution 
in nature and by its productive transformation of nature. Labour is the specific human 
capacity that underlies human relations with nature, because it is through this 
appropriation and transformation of nature that human society secures its conditions of 
existence. In doing this, human society makes and remakes itself As Parsons argues: 
"Man's (sic) dialectical relations with nature, in which man transforms it and is thereby 
transformed, is the very essence of his own human nature" (Parsons, 1977: xi). 
In order to meet both basic and complex needs humans intervene in nature and 
appropriate from it. Appropriation can involve perception, orientation, or the physical 
transformation of the natural environment to satisfy a variety of physical and spiritual 
needs. It is through the act of appropriation that humans make nature part of themselves. 
In doing so humans are exercising their power, realising their potential as humans, and 
the ways in which they do this is determined historically by the level of their interaction 
with nature and by human social relations (Ollman, 1971: 91-7). How humans 
appropriated from nature in hunter-gatherer societies, and how they related to one another 
in the social act of doing so, differs dramatically from human-nature relations and human 
social relations under contemporary capitalism. 
Human material appropriation of nature is a very broad notion, more narrowly expressed 











production of use-values, makes use of all human senses and powers. It is the expression 
of human power in its natural environment, the process of objectifying humanity in 
nature (OIlman, 1971: 99-105). Work on nature is, according to Marx, the life-activity of 
the human species, and it is the process through which humanity expresses its unique 
need and capacity to forever explore new possibilities - to change the world. What 
human nature demands, and what nature as a whole makes possible, is that human beings, 
as part-of-nature, appropriate and transform nature (Grundmann, 1991: 284). 
It is this essential relation between humans and nature that lies at the basis of Marx's 
materialist approach to history. It is through this philosophical perspective, as 
Grundmann explains, that we encounter 
the abstract relation between man and nature, as a transhistorical condition, and then 
the specific historical forms which this relation assumes ... Marx conceives of a 
transhistorical situation of mankind (sic) in which it always has to transform nature in 
order to survive. This is a process that takes place within societies and by means of 
technology. Both societies and technology are in constant development. Marx 
conceptualises this in a theoretical model which is commonly called historical 
materialism (Grundmann, 1991: 7-9). 
Perhaps one of the strongest, and most valid critiques of Marx's work, relates to his 
"technological optimism" with regard to the human potential to transform nature. As 
Benton argues, "Marx under-represents the significance of non-manipulable natural 
conditions of labour-processes and over-represents the role of human intentional 
transformative powers vis-a.-vis nature" (Benton, 1989: 571). Marx did not pay enough 
attention either to the physical limitations of natural resources exploited by human 











intervention on ecological processes. Grundmann however, disagrees with Benton's 
critique, and, in defending Marx's technological optimism, argues that what is non-
manipulable is open to change, and to technological challenge, however undesirable that 
might be (Grundmann, 1991 a). 
From an ethical and ecological point of view, as opposed to technological perspective, 
Benton's criticism is important. While it is necessary to understand Marx's technological 
optimism in its historical context (ie. in the early days of capitalism when human impact 
on the natural environment was less obviously destructive), and to sympathise with his 
rejection of the political conservatism of Malthus's natural limits arguments, it is 
important to temper human self-confidence with our contemporary understanding 6f the 
negative effects that human activity is having on ecological systems. There is no need to 
shy away from the fact that there are natural limits to how and to what degree humans 
can transform nature to meet their needs. At the same time, natural limits can still' be 
understood as relative to any historical, geographical, and social context and a 
fundamental reorganisation of society can shift what those limits are (Benton, 1989: 584). 
Social equality, production for need and not for profit, and the utilisation of new energy 
sources can make a vast difference to how we define the possibilities and limits of human 
transformation of nature. 
While our natural environment plays a big role in conditioning and determining how we 
make use of it, human appropriation from nature always leaves .its mark. As human 











human action upon it. "In each historical period," says OIlman, ''we are presented 
throughout nature with the evidence of what man (sic) wants, what he is capable of, and 
what satisfies him" (OIlman, 1971: 97). But this process is not just one way. As Marx 
argued, "the history of nature and the history of men (sic) are mutually conditioned ... 
(because) by acting on the external world and changing it (we) at the same time change 
our own nature" (quoted in Harvey, 1996: 26). We act on the world as subjects, and in 
tum become objects affected by our transformations of nature. 
How humans relate to nature materially, in their appropriation of it for their variety of 
needs, shapes then how they perceive their natural environment and relate to one another 
socially. It is in this sense that production, as human social appropriation of nature, lies at 
the heart of all the cultural, political, and ideological features of human social relations. 
And it is through this mutual conditioning and determination that human history takes its 
course. Put slightly differently by an environmental historian: 
An ecological history begins by assuming a dynamic and changing relationship 
between environment and culture ... it assumes that the two are dialectical. 
Environment may initially shape the range of choices available to a people at a 
given moment but then culture reshapes the environment responding to those 
choices. The reshaped environment presents a new set of possibilities for cultural 
production, thus setting up a new cycle of mutual determination. Changes in the 
way people create and recreate their livelihood must be analysed in terms of 
changes not only in their social relations but in their ecological ones as well 
(Cronon, quoted in Harvey, 1996: 27) 
Marxist theory emphasises that the human species is self-creating through its productive 
and labouring activity, involving both the humanisation of nature and the naturalisation 











By the technologies whereby we extract and utilise resources for the satisfaction 
of human requirements, we 'transform' the natural world, and the environment 
itself thus comes to bear the imprint of our particular patterning of need. At the 
same time, since we are creatures dependent upon an objective environment for. 
becoming the subjects that we are, we thereby create our own 'nature': we are 
returned to ourselves, through the objective products of our industry, since these 
provide the context for all our aesthetic, moral, and cognitive experiences. This in 
tum implies that such experience must itself be viewed as the outcome of 
dialectical mediation: or subjective needs and senses acquire their objective 
existence in the products we create for their satisfaction, and these then condition 
our subjective sensibility and mould our future needs, aesthetic sense, and so forth 
(Soper, 1996: 87). 
Marx spoke of pristine nature as "first nature", and humanly transformed nature as 
"second nature" (Grundmann, 1991b: 285). This second, humanised, or socially 
constructed nature, becomes more and more the nature that humans experience, given the 
penetration of human settlement and activity into every comer of the globe. Nature, as an 
objective set of processes independent of our specific interaction with it, can never be 
comprehended as such, in its pristine condition. As soon as we begin to appropriate 
nature, even merely through our senses, we do so through the mediation of social and 
cultural constructs (Schmidt, 1971: 320-1). At different times in history, humans have 
made sense of nature in very different ways, and this is reflected in a variety of cultural, 
religious, and ethical forms of expression (parsons, 1977: 3). Even at a single time and 
place in history, different classes and genders will perceive their natural world with a 












Although it is only possible to conceptualise and formulate statements about nature by 
using our culturally mediated categories, this does not mean that the natural world does 
not have a real existence outside of our discourse and experience. The very fact that 
nature operates beyond our understanding of it at any point in time; the very fact that we 
have for most of human history not anticipated our impact on ecological processes and 
have little clear idea of the implications of that impact, shows clearly that our 
construction of nature is not nature itself As Soper argues, "while it is true that much of 
what we refer to as 'natural' is a 'cultural construct' in the sense that it has acquired its 
form as a consequence of human activity, that activity does not 'construct' the powers 
and processes upon which it is dependent for its operation" (Soper, 1995: 249). 
Human cultural and ideological constructions of nature are not arbitrary. They reflect and 
express the real engagement and interaction that human society, in a particular historical 
context, has with its natural environment. But these expressions are not just passive 
reflections; they form part of our self-conscious activity and thus become meaningful in 
how we relate to ourselves, our fellow humans, our human nature, and to our natural 
environment. 
2.5 HUMAN ALIENATION FROM NATURE UNDER CAPITALISM 
Marx's argument that humans express their potential as a species through their collective 
appropriation of nature is the basis for his characterisation of human nature as well as the 
starting point for his materialist analysis of human history. Through production, human 











bears the imprint of human intervention, and this transformed nature, as human society's 
expression of itself, reflects itself in human social relations. In this way human society, at 
. different points in history, becomes organised socially, politically, and culturally around 
its economic appropriation of nature. 
The ability of humans to relate to nature in this dynamic way is far greater and more 
varied than that of other animal species; it is so great in fact that we have the capacity to 
separate, estrange, or alienate ourselves from the nature on which we depend. And to 
alienate ourselves from our natural environment is to alienate ourselves from our human 
nature. Alienation, Marx argued, is the human social condition created by private 
property ownership, capitalist relations of production, and the purely utilitarian attitude 
towards nature that those property relations and social relations imply (Benton, 1993: 28; 
Soper, 1995: 46). 
As a species, humans are self-conscious and creative. To develop these capacities they 
need to be social, to work, and to be in close association with external nature, their 
"inorganic body" (Dickens, 1996: 57). The development of private ownership of natural 
resources, and the dispossession that this implies, estranges human beings from their 
engagement with nature, from their labour power, from what they produce, from their 
fellow women and men, and from their potential as humans (Benton, 1993: 27). Under 
these conditions, "human powers operate, but in a distorted fashion .. (and) .. human 












It is common for contemporary environmentalists, and especially deep ecologists, to 
claim that humans are alienated from nature. This term is used to describe bleak: 
environments, individualism, lack of meaning and purpose, people's disregard for their 
natural surroundings, and the arrogant human assumption that nature is just there to be 
exploited (Soper, 1996: 85). While this use of alienation certainly captures the general 
spirit of a human society estranged from nature, Marx used the concept in a more specific 
way (Vogel, 1988: 367-8). 
For Marx, alienation is a condition rooted in the process of production, whereby human 
subjects see themselves as subservient to external objects or processes which they in fact 
are responsible for creating. The most obvious examples of such fetishised objects are 
money, commodities, and market forces, which human society comes to regards as 
natural entities and forces over which it has no controL The human origin of these objects 
is masked and they become reified as things that have an independent power over human 
interests, needs, and activities (Soper, 1996: 85-7). It is out of this initial process of 
estrangement that Marx then characterised alienation as a more general condition 
whereby people lose a proper understanding of themselves and their relation to the world 
around them, and thereby lose essential aspects of their well-being (Dickens, 1996: 58). 
In his early writings, Marx developed a critique of the historical development of the 
private ownership of economic property in terms of how this mediation of human 











themselves, from one another, and from their human capacity (Dickens, 1992: 72). 
Private property lays the basis for the development of purely instrumental relations 
between humans and their natural environment and thus begins to erode the spiritual 
connection that humans have with nature (Benton, 1989: 589). The all-sided appreciation 
and appropriation of nature that is so essential to human nature becomes subordinated to 
the desire for possession. As Marx expressed it, "all the physical and intellectual senses 
have been replaced by. the simple estrangement of all these senses - by the sense of 
having" (quoted in Dickens, 1992: 69). This historical distortion of human nature reaches 
full expression under capitalism, where private ownership is fetishised into an 
unquestionable right, if not a law of nature! And it is at this human achievement, in all its 
perversity, that Engels expressed lucid outrage: 
To make the earth the object of huckstering - the earth which is our one and all, 
the first condition of our existence - was the last step toward making oneself an 
object of huckstering. It was and is to this very day an immorality surpassed only 
by the immorality of self-alienation (quoted in Parsons, 1977: 172). 
Marx argued that capitalist private ownership of natural resources, or the means of 
production, expressed an unprecedented alienation of human society from nature. He 
regarded 
the mode of perceiving nature, under the rule of private property and money, as a 
real contempt for, and a practical degradation of nature ... (where) ... for the first 
time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of 
utility ... and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appear merely as a 
ruse so as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of 
consumption or as a means of production (quoted in Parsons, 1977: 15-8). 
Not only does capitalist private ownership of natural resources degrade nature and 











dispossession of the bulk of humanity. The private ownership of natural resources by 
some implies their right to deny others access to these essential conditions of existence . 
. Private property thereby creates, as the mirror image of itself, alienated 'free' labour that 
is forced to sell its human capacity to work in order to survive. It is in the process of 
production that these two distorted versions of humanity - capital and labour - produce 
and reproduce the basis for humanity's condition of alienation (Olman, 1977: 143). 
The alienation of workers in the process of production under capitalism revolves around 
their dispossession, and thus estrangement, from three essential connections. Firstly, 
having been forced into wage labour (primarily through such coercive measures as land 
dispossession and being forced into a cash economy), workers lose control and ownership 
over their capacity to wor~ their labour power. The second connection that is lost to the 
workers is the fact that they have no control over the conditions, means, or instruments of 
production that they make use of or work with in the process of production (OIlman, 
1971: 144). 
Finally, workers are estranged from what they produce, from the objects of their creative 
activity. Since it is through productive activity that humans express their creative power, 
the products or objects people produce contain a part of themselves and materially 
express their life activity. But under capitalism workers cannot realise that connection, 
since what they produce is immediately, at every step, the property of somebody else 











The qualities that humans lose in this process, they then project onto the commodities 
they produce. These objects take on a magical fetishised quality which serves to stimulate 
and feed human hunger for fulfilment Ironically, it is then the market, money, and 
commodities that bring people together, cement relationships, provide for collective 
activity and association, and allow people to meet their needs (Dickens, 1992: 70-1). As 
the expression of the exchange-value of all other commodities, money takes on a special 
significance. It becomes the sole expression and purpose of human productive effort. 
People want money because it enables them to meet their needs. It makes everything 
possible. Ac'cording to Marx, "Money is the alienated ability of mankind (sic)" (OIlman, 
1971: 193-4). 
Alienation is not only a condition facing workers - it expresses itself through all social 
relations, and takes different . forms in different classes according to their material 
conditions and· life experiences. As Marx argued; "the whole of human servitude is 
involved in the relation of the worker to production, and every relation of servitude is but 
a modification and consequence of this relation" (quoted in OIlman, 1971: 154). Outside 
of production, social relations under capitalism take the form of "struggling, cajoling, 
begging, conniving, stealing, lying and pushing others out of the way in order to obtain 
the necessities of life", where people in all classes confront one another as alien and 
competing individuals (Ollman, 1971: 213). 
If class relations under capitalism express people's alienation from themselves and from 











alienation of people from their human nature. As Marx argued, "in estranging man (sic) 
from nature, and from himself, his own active functions, his life activity, estranged . labour 
estranges the species from man" (quoted in Tollman, 1991: 65-6). The potential of human 
. nature is distorted and its creative capacity compromised through capitalist social 
relations and the property regime on which these class relations rest.vii 
Alienation is not just a condition that faces humanity in its economic activity, for 
"wherever oue travels in the realm of estrangement, the story is the same" (OIlman, 1971: 
222). Emotional and spiritual aspects of human nature become dislocated and take on a 
life of their own. Alienation, as the "splintering of human nature into a number of 
misbegotten parts," is a material reality that then finds expression in people's minds 
(Ollman, 1971: 135). Body and spirit become separated and gods are created as external 
embodiments of humanity's alienated spiritual capacities. As Marx argued, 'lhe abstract 
enmity between physical sense and spirit is necessary so long as the human feeling for 
nature, the human sense of nature, and therefore also the natural sense of man (sic), are 
not yet produced by man's own work" (Ollman, 1971: 227). 
Human alienation from nature finds a variety of expressions in people's conceptualisation 
of nature and in their attitudes towards their natural environments. In spite of our 
increasing socialisation of nature, human interaction with nature is less and less direct. 
There is less immediate sensual experience, so essential for human well being. We treat 
nature as a set of fragmented parts from which we are separated. Materially we express 











compensate for our utilitarianism with a romantic concern for nature so that a purified 
and fetishised version of nature begins to take off in the human imagination (Dickens, 
1992:. 151; Dickens, 1996: 104-6). 
Our romantic image of nature comes to represent something that humanity has lost - a 
yearning to go back somewhere, out of our present, out of time and out of human culture. 
This idealisation of nature is a response to the insecurity caused by our alienation and by 
the rapid pace of social and environmental change. The present is too quick and too 
. disrespectful of the past to allow for real experience, so people try to slow things down, 
try to return to the past in order to regain experience. In their concern for nature, human 
beings are looking for an experiential present, a sense of belonging that will relieve their 
feelings of alienation (Soper, 1995: 198). But as Harvey argues, the ''tourist gaze" at a 
romanticised nature is very different to the sense of value that humans derive from a lived 
experience in an environment in which they are embedded through work, play, and a 
variety of cultural activities (Harvey, 1996: 36). 
For the most part, our simultaneous abuse and romanticisation of nature come together 
and share their realisation as commodities in the market place. They combine in 
advertising, tourism, and green consumerism, so that our longing for authenticity gets 
turned into another form of alienation. As Soper argues, "a certain idea of nature becomes 
more desirable, and the desire for it more manipulable, as the reality it conceptualises is 











Alienation, like any other material process, is not absolute. Contained within this human 
condition are the elements of struggle towards new possibilities and new worlds. Just as 
the alienation of workers at the workplace prompts indignation and the confidence to 
struggle, so the condition of estrangement and insecurity facing the majority of 
humankind forces us to search for our humanity. And there are indeed a million 
individual and collective ways in which people connect with one another and with their 
natural environment that transcend our alienation, open up new challenges, and thereby 
confirm the human potential. Alienation, as a condition that has developed historically, 
suggests its opposite - human self-realisation - as a possibility. And to transcend our 
alienation, with all the deceptions and illusions it contains, requires a self-conscious act 
on the part of human society. In Marx's view: 
The positive transcendence of private property, as the appropriation of human life, 
is therefore the positive transcendence of all estrangement that is to say the 
return of man (sic) ... to his human existence ... This communism .. .is the genuine 
resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man - the 
true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the 
individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it 
knows itself to be this solution (quoted in Benton, 1993: 29,31). 
2.6 HUMAN MASTERY OF ITS RELATIONS WITH NATURE 
In Marx's vision of communist society the transcendence of private ownership of natural 
resources and economic property and the disappearance of class relations, provides the 
basis for humans to fully realise their potential. Competitive individualism is replaced by 
mutual co-operation, allowing humans to positively express their social nature (OIlman, 











human being - a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of 
previous development" (Marx, quoted in Parsons, 1977: 210). People will no longer seek 
to satisfy their needs by depriving others, so that need and its realisation lose their 
egotistical nature. Human need itself becomes transformed insofar as competition for 
material wealth becomes replaced by the collective purpose of self-realisation (Benton, 
1993: 29). Human economic activity becomes human in the sense that it is directed 
towards collective social need and is no longer mediated and alienated by possession, 
greed, and profit-making. 
According to Marx, this struggle on the part of human society to recover its humanity 
necessarily involves the struggle to recover human unity with nature (parsons, 1977: 17). 
As human needs become redefined, nature loses its mere utility value. As humans start to 
recognise their engagement with nature as human engagement for the purpose of 
producing human (as opposed to alienated) products, they start to put their natural 
environment to proper human use (Dickens, 1992: 69~ Vogel, 1988: 382-3). It is thus 
through the humanisation of nature, a proper recognition of our human (as opposed to 
abusive and alienated) relation to nature, that human society can overcome the dichotomy 
of humans (as subject) over and against nature (as the object). As Eckersley argues: 
This socialist notion of nature as our inorganic body, toward which we have a 
responsibility of care, is juxtaposed to the capitalist conception of nature as an 
alien 'other' to be exploited for profit (Eckersley, 1996: 279). 
Marx used different terminology to conceptualise the potential new relationship that 
human society could construct with nature under communism, namely, "humanisation", 











which Marx developed his arguments, is regarded by deep ecologists and other ecocentric 
perspectives as the most objectionable aspect of Marx's humanism. Ecocentrism argues 
. that Marx's technicist and productivist vision of humans dominating nature implies more 
of the same arrogant human abuse of the natural environment (Grundmann, 1991b: 3). 
Even within the contemporary Marxist environmental tradition there is considerable 
controversy over the ecological meaning of Marx's vision of humanising nature. This 
controversy is fuelled by an ambiguity in Marx, i.e. by the tension between his early 
"weak" humanism, where he emphasised the unity between human society and nature, 
and his later "strong" humanism, where he emphasised human domination of nature on 
human terms (Dickens, 1992: 85). 
Benton, taking up one position within this debate, criticises Marx's strong 
anthropocentrism and argues that the concept of humanising nature is too loaded with 
notions of domination and transformation (Benton, 1989: 581). Grundmann, however, 
seeks to defend Marx by arguing that domination and humanisation should rather be read 
as "mastery". Grundmann argues that ecological crises are the result of a lack of mastery 
of nature and that the humanisation of the natural environment involves increasing human 
understanding and control. Grundmann suggests that Marx did not simply equate 
technological development with mastery, insofar as he recognised the potential for 
ecological damage under capitalism. For Grundmann, the concept of domination must be 











undermining the quality of life through ecological destruction (Grundmanl\ 1991 a; 
1991b: 2-5). 
Soper, while certainly not defending Marx's every word in the same way that Grundmann 
seems to, argues that while Marx clearly was committed to the idea of mastering nature 
through technology and science, his perspective was not one of unbridled productivism 
and disregard for nature. She explains that any ecologically-sound socialist corrective to 
the damage brought by capitalism will have to involve highly sophisticated technological 
interventiol\ and that the very restructuring of human needs, values, and priorities 
implied by socialism would bring about an ecologically sensitive engagement with nature 
(Soper, 1996: 92-5). In response to ecocentric critiques of Marx, Vogel draws on Marx's 
normative interpretation of humanisation to argue that it does not mean domination and 
abuse, but rather suggests a compassionate relationship with nature. In Vogel's own 
words, "to see the environment as both already' human and as potentially further 
humanisable is not necessarily to see it as unimportant, as 'mere matter' to be 
manipulated, but rather perhaps to cherish it as an objective expression of our connection, 
of our own objectivity" (Vogel, 1988: 383-4). 
In his debate with Grundmanl\ Benton argued that Marx's technological optimism (and 
Grundmann's defence of it) portrays nature as too passive and predictable. Human 
society can only go so far in mastering the complexity and unpredictability of nature, so 
that it is unthinkable and undesirable to adopt a perspective that advocates a limitless 











develop human mastery or control over how human society relates to nature, rather than 
over nature itself In other words, technology and all forms of mediation between humans 
and nature should be brought under ecologically-wise social control (Benton, 1992: 66). 
In the light of this debate around the Marxist meaning of humanising nature it is 
important to remember Soper's advice on approaching Marx's ambiguity with some 
creative flexibilityviii. Marx's normative statements about human mastery of nature in a 
future communist society contain incredibly rich philosophical and political suggestions, 
and it is really up to us to give progressive content to the possibilities that he outlined. 
Our expenence of the destructive impact of capitalist economIc activity on our 
environment over the last century, makes it self-evident that a progressive human mastery 
of our relationship with nature has to be ecologically sound, and that we have to err on 
the side of prudent pessimism rather than technological optimism. In this sense, the 
humanisation of nature must not imply an extension of human domination and abusive 
control, but rather an expansion of human understanding of nature, its processes, and its 
natural limits. Writing in 1876, Engels captured well the distinction between an abusive 
domination of nature and a human mastery of its relations with its natural environment. 
Let us not flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over 
nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is 
true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and 
third place it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel 
out the first. .. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over 
nature - but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its 
midst, and that our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage 
over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly 











Given our peculiar human capacity for self-conscious activity, it is only through 
mastering our ecological relation to nature that we can begin to address our abuse of the 
environment. This progressive humanisation of nature is not just a scientific or moral 
exercise, compatible with capitalist social relations. It can only happen, Marxism would 
argue, when we overcome our alienation and estrangement from our fellow humans, from 
our human nature, and from our natural environment through a fundamental 
transformation of human social relations. What is an ecological issue is also therefore 
immediately an economic, social, and. cultural issue, the totality of which confronts us as 
a self-conscious question of choice and therefore as a political question. 
In this chapter I have argued that dialectical materialism offers a holistic and dynamic 
perspective on all life-processes and emphasises the importance of understanding discrete 
entities as expressions of changing relationships. In this regard we must start with 
humans as part-of-nature, because it is by ·virtue of our natural existence that we exercise 
our relative independence from our natural environment and transform it to meet our 
socially-defined needs. This is not a one-way relationship. Human history is at the same 
time environmental history, so that human society and nature mutually determine and 
impact on each other. Marxism argues that the particular way in which human society 
relates to nature changes historically, and that this relationship finds expression 
materially, culturally, philosophically, and spiritually. Through its commodification of 
nature, contemporary capitalism has entrenched a human/nature dualism which finds 
expression in an alienated conception of nature as a set of utilitarian objects or as a 











In the following two chapters I argue that dominant discourses in contemporary 
environmentalism express rather than challenge these alienated conceptions of nature. 
While on the one hand technocentric environmentalism regards nature as an object to be 
bought, sold, or managed, ecocentrism on the other hanQ, idealises nature as the 
embodiment of all that is external to profane humanity. Without negating the positive 
contributions of both perspectives to defending our natural environment, I argue that their 












Notes to Chapter 2 
i Essential characteristics or relations are those that are fundamental and necessary to the 
existence of something. An essential feature is something that is inherent in the nature or 
constitution of an entity or a relationship. This essential characteristic will take different 
forms historically. For example, Marxism would argue that humans are essentially part-
of-nature and apart-from-nature. The specific way in which their reliance on nature and 
their independence from it manifests itself, varies with historical circumstances. 
Similarly, Marxism would argue that humans are essentially social beings, needing to 
cooperate with one another. Once again, the exact form that this co-operation takes 
(economically, socially, and politically) has varied dramatically throughout history. 
ii MoSt notable in this regard is Marx's 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 
ill Dialectics, a form oflogic practised by the early Greeks and prominent in Buddhist and 
other Eastern philosophy, emphasised the role of contradictory dynamics within life-
. processes as the basis for their development and change. Marx and Engels developed 
their dialectical materialism through a critique .of the idealism of the dialectics of the 
early 19C German philosopher Hegel and of the mechanical materialism of Feuer bach. 
iv Here we are referring to systems of Western philosophy. Eastern wisdom offers a 
deeper and longer tradition of holism - a holism which emphasises the continuity, 
complexity, interconnectedness, contradiction, and dynamism of organismic life-
processes. Specifically, the Chinese conception of Chi as a life force that embraces spirit 
and matter, is made up of two elements, yin and yang, whose dynamic and often 
contradictory relationship gives rise to all forms of life (Wei-Ming, 1989: 68-73). 
v This understanding of human dependence on a connection with nature is echoed in 
Chinese wisdom which argues that human nature contains the capacity and the need to 
take part in and be conscious of its connection to nature. This makes possible the full 
expression of human potential. Anthropocentric self-centredness and any disconnection 
from the life-processes around us (Wei Ming, 1989: 76) compromise our human 
potential. 
vi Chinese wisdom regards humans as being the most sentient beings, having Chi in its 
highest expression. "It is man (sic) alone who receives the five elements in their highest 
excellence (water, fire, wood, metal, and earth), and therefore he is the most intelligent. 











principles of his nature (humanity, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness) are 
aroused by, and react to, the external world and engage in activity: good and evil are 
distinguished; and human affairs take place" (Chou Tun-I quoted in Wei Ming, 1989: 
.75). 
vii Dickens argues that the contemporary globalisation of capitalism adds new dimensions 
to people's alienation. Human experience and knowledge have meaning within specific 
spatial, cultural, and temporal contexts, and globalisation stretches that context far 
beyond direct experience. Globalisation increasingly separates aspects of a production 
process, the products from the producers, and the consumers from the context of 
production. Developments in technology, transportation, and communications decrease 
reliance on local environments, climate, and seasonality for production. Nature, as a force 
of production, becomes more and more remote. People are increasingly affected by 
events and decisions that are outside of their controL This undermines people's sense of 
having their place in the world, their identity. This creates an "ontological insecurity" in 
people, an insecurity that arises out of the tension between the human need to make sense 
of direct sensuous experience and the increasing complexity and distance in social 
interactions (Dickens, 1992: 146-57). 












NATURE AS A COMMODITY: A CRITIQUE OF 
TECHNOCENTRIC ENVIRONMENTALISM 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
My aim in this chapter is to offer a critique of the philosophical framework and politics of 
the technocentric perspective within mainstream environmentalism. Drawing on· the 
tradition of wilderness conservation, technocentrism forms the dominant approach within 
Western environmental thought and practice (O'Riordan in Pepper, 1993: 34). As such it 
is strongly institutionalised within national governments, international agencies, 
academia, business, and the environmental profession. Technocentrism looks to the 
pragmatic application of science and technology, market forces, and environmental 
management for the mitigation of the negative environmental impacts of economic 
activity (O'Riordan in Pepper, 1993: 34). 
T echnocentric environmentalism assumes two broad, though overlapping, forms. In its 
most conservative form, technocentrism serves as an extension to neoliberal economics. 
The 'business as usual' perspective of environmental economics sees the privatisation of 
nature and the attachment of monetary values to environmental goods and services as the 
route along which human society will come to properly appreciate its natural resources. 
Environmental management systems, technological innovation, and enlightened 
engineering will assist the invisible hand of the free mark~t in protecting the environment 











The second thrust of technocentrism is what O'Riordan describes as the 
accommodationist (or reformist) perspective of liberal business and political 
organisations (including some 'green' political parties), environmental scientists, and a 
. range of trade union, civic, and non~governmental organisations (O'Riordan in Pepper, 
1993: 34). It is also the dominant perspective within academia and within the 
environmental consultancy profession in the West. Often referred to as "shallow 
ecology"i, this environmental reformist stream believes that existing capitalist political, 
social, and economic relations can embrace greater ecological sensitivity without being 
transformed in any significant way. It seeks greater protection for the natural 
environment through impact assessment, environmental management systems, increased 
accountability and regulation,· environmental planning, and environmental education 
(O'Riordan in Pepper, 1993: 34; O'Connor, 1997: 270). 
I argue that the techno centric conception of nature as a commodity to be marketed or 
managed reflects a dualistic perspective on human-nature relations that arises out of our 
contemporary alienation from nature. Trapped within the worldview that has long 
regarded nature as a set of utilitarian resources, the protection of which must always be 
compromised by a profit motive, technocentrism has been accused of offering little more 
than "end-of-pipe" solutions (Harvey, 1996: 374 ) and "cosmetic environmentalism" 
(Gare, 1995: 100). 
My critique of technocentrism in this chapter is carried out through an analysis of its 











marrying the interests of environmental protection with capitalist economic growth. 
Before doing that however, I outline the philosophical premise of technocentric 
environmentalism - that nature is a 'thing,' somehow external to human social relations, 
that needs to be utilised, exploited, conserved, or managed and to trace some of the 
historical processes that generated this alienated conception of nature. I do this firstly by 
exploring the utilitarian conception of nature, and secondly, by examining Western 
capitalism's packaging and marketing of 'wilderness'ill as a commodity. 
By presenting this alienated and commodified nature as 'natural', techno centric 
environmentalism is able to promote the notion that the welfare of our natural 
environment is somehow detachable from the economic interests and social relations that 
are responsible for environmental degradation. In exploring this discourse within 
environmental economics and environmental reformism, I argue that the perceived 
objectives of sustainable development are not compatible with the economic and social 
system of contemporary capitalism. 
3.2 MARKETING NA TITRE AND WILDERNESS AS COMMODITIES 
Nature as a source of usable goods and services 
The development of capitalism over the last two centuries, from its birthplace in Europe 
and through colonial and imperialist expansion across the globe, has had a profound 
impact on human relations with nature. An insatiable demand for raw materials, the 











agriculture over arable land, the freeing of people from subsistence production into wage 
labour, continual technological innovation, and the detachment of production. and 
consumption from an immediate natural environment, have all been features of the 
process through which nature has been turned into a commodity (Beinhart and Coates, 
1995: 7). As such, nature is regarded today primarily as a source of usable and 
exchangeable goods and services, embracing as this does both raw materials for 
productive activity as well as access to wilderness as a highly marketable aesthetic and 
recreational asset. 
Within the cultural tradition of the West, an alienated instrumental view of nature did not 
simply spring out of the capitalist market-place but has deeper origins in religious, 
philosophical, and scientific thought. Lynn-White argues that the contemporary 
anthropocentric attitude of dominating nature has its origins in Christianity, in the notion 
that humans "are too good and too significant for the earth and are paying it only a 
passing visit" (in Hallman, 1992: 104).iv Christianity's devaluation of nature has fostered 
a dichotomy between humans and nature and between the human body and human soul. 
This has allowed for the self-elevation of the human immortal soul over and above the 
rest of nature. Historically Christianity has provided an ideological framework for the 
development of utilitarian philosophy and capitalist instrumentalism (Hallman, 1992: 
104-5). This perspective stands in contrast to most other pre-capitalist religious traditions, 
most notably those Eastern philosophical and cultural traditions that have emphasised 











With more immediate and direct bearing on the development of capitalism, is the 
pervasive influence of Cartesian v thinking on Western science and philosophy. Cartesian 
thought, as the basis for empiricist and positivist scientific thought and practice, separates 
organisms from their environment and from the dynamic processes of which they form a 
part (Harvey, 1996: 61). This alienated form of apprehending living reality turns nature, 
as a set of systems and processes with which humans are integrally connected physically 
and socially, into "a cOllection of usable elements, a mere external prerequisite of human 
existence, to be moulded according to our wishes" (Haila, 1992: 11). 
While the origins of this alienated conception of nature lie in the dualism established in 
religious thought and in the mechanical epistemology of Western science and philosophy, 
it has become consolidated and entrenched through capitalism's commodification of 
nature. As Schmookler graphically stated, 
. .. in the grip of a system that breaks everything down into commodity form the 
earth is violated. The living planet is dismembered, as land becomes real estate, 
forests become lumber, oceans become fisheries and sinks (quoted in Foster, 
1995b: 26). 
This alienated regard for our natural environment is not confined to the West. With the 
globalisation of capitalist economic and social relations a utilitarian and instrumental 
attitude has come to eclipse pre-capitalist cultural perspectives internationally. Nowhere 
is this more obvious than in the East, where in spite of deeply holistic traditional 
worldviews on human-nature relations, some of the worst environmental abuse is being 
experienced (Callieot and Ames, 1989: xix). While the global commodification of nature 











wider cultural alienation by turning humanity's spiritual connection witli nature into a 
marketable asset It is to the ideology of wilderness that we now tum. 
The commodification of wilderness 
Nature as a commodity does not only have meaning as a material resource, but is also 
marketable for those in search of an authentic wilderness experience vi. If the purpose of 
our conquest of nature has been to reduce it to a use-value, the spiritual expression of this 
estrangement has been the construction of wilderness areas in the form of protected 
reserves and parks. The irony is that these 'natural' areas require considerable human 
intervention and management to maintain their authenticity (Hayles, 1989: 410). Like 
caged animals, or indigenous people forced into reserves,. protected wilderness areas 
emerged in the wake of conquest and settlement - a product of the very historical process 
that threatened their existence (Cronon, 1995: 78-80). 
The notion of wilderness is central to the historical development of conservationism, a 
tradition that is still strong within contemporary environmental management.vii The 
history of conservationism in North America and South Africa, where it grew out of the 
process of colonisation and coercive capitalist expansion (Reinhart and Coates, 1995: 7-
11), drew on two convergent cultural traditions that of frontier conquest and the 
Romantic "doctrine of the sublime"viii - which were functional to capitalist expansion and 











In the 18th century, both the idea and experience of wilderness evoked conflicting 
responses in the minds of Europeans. On the one hand it carried negative connotations, 
being associated biblically with those places outside of Eden that were filled with 
confusion and despair. On the other hand, the Romantic search for awe-inspiring majesty 
offered wilderness as a mysterious cathartic experience which could serve as an antidote 
to the comfort of the civilised European world. Both of these associations provided a 
challenge - to rediscover primal human energies through the process of taming and 
domesticating indigenous people, wild animals, and wide open spaces (Cronon, 1995: 72-
77) . 
. Just as European racism allowed for the conquest of indigenous peoples, so gender values 
were highly significant in the domestication of nature within this frontier culture. In the 
North American frontier culture the masculine cowboy personified the rugged 
individualism ofliving on the margins of civilised society (Cronon, 1995: 77). In South 
Africa, hunting wild animals was central to the passage from boyhood to manhood 
(Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 17). The evils of nature, like the dangerous wiles of Eve in 
the Genesis story, had to be subdued. Virgin land only needed domestication by man and 
agriculture in order to be bountiful (Merchant, 1995: 145). As Merchant argues: 
The narrative of frontier expansion is a story of male energy subduing female nature, 
taming the wild, ploughing the land, recreating the garden lost by Eve. American 
males lived the frontier myth in their everyday lives, making the land safe for 
capitalism and commodity production. Once tamed by men, the land was safe for 











Conservationism emerged both in North America and in South Africa in the late 19th 
century out of the destructive impact of frontier expansion. It comprised a mixture of 
. economic concern for dwindling resources, nostalgia, scientific interest, recreational and 
. aesthetic needs of the colonial elite (and later the mobile middle class), and a drive for 
settler national and cultural identity (Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 72-5). Hunting controls, 
protection of indigenous forests, and land conservation reflected a concern for the 
efficient use of economic resources. Alongside these utilitarian motives, there emerged a 
cultural concern to protect areas of wild beauty. Wilderness had now become a 
domesticated Eden. Indigenous people had been forced into reserves, leaving 
dehumanised 'pristine' areas. Unspoilt nature was no longer associated with danger and 
mystery but had became an object of contemplative pleasure, reflecting the scientific and 
aesthetic interests of the affluent (Cronon, 1995: 72-5). A cultural yearning for authentic 
experience led to the establishment of game reserves, national parks, and protected areas 
(Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 72). The frontier culture of conquest gave way to the 
nostalgic and vicarious pioneering of wilderness tourism so that "land spared the hoof, 
the axe, the pick and the plough was none the less commoditized" (Beinhart and Coates, 
1995: 78). 
The packaging of nature as an object to be bought, sold, conserved, or managed, is 
primarily the function of utilitarian economic interests but it also embraces the 
contemporary Western spiritual appreciation of wilderness. Within the framework of 
Western religious and philosophical traditions and through the development of 











humans and nature. Natural resources are regarded as 'useful objects' and a dehumanised 
wildemessoffers us 'authentic' nature. It is through this same alienated perspective on 
nature that technocentric environmentalism seeks to remedy our contemporary abuse of 
nature. 
3.3 THE TECHNOCENTRIC DISCOURSE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Technocentric environmentalism seeks to reconcile the status quo of existing capitalist 
economic and social relations with environmental protection. Both environmental 
economics and environmental reformism articulate this objective through the discourse of 
sustainable development. The concept of sustainable development was first formulated in 
the 1970's as an attempt by conservationists to promote recognition of ecological limits 
to economic growth (Hill and Bowen, 1997: 224-5). It was understood to offer a 
compromise between business and environmental interests. Sustainable development 
acquired more specific definition during the 1980's when the Brundtland Report invested 
the concept with the principle of intergenerational equity, and identified the abolition of 
poverty as an integral aspect of environmental management (Hill and Bowen, 1997: 224-
5). 
The objective of sustainable development is promoted by a wide variety of environmental 
perspectives and can also be found in documents of the World Bank and United States 
military. This does not reveal any common vision but suggests that the term can be used 
to mean almost anything (Peet and Watts, 1996: 1). While some emphasise the need to 











a more holistic and ecologically sensitive redefinition of development (Barbier, 1987; 
Goodland, 1995: 1-5). 
Over the last 30 years there has been a growing awareness of the connection between 
environmental problems and other global problems such as population growth, resource 
scarcity, and poverty. It is out of this recognition that the discourse of sustainable 
development emerged as an attempt to shift away from nature conservation and towards 
managing the environment as a development issue. The emergence of a range of 
international institutional initiatives and regulatory agendas concerned with the 
environment and the advance of science and technology reflect the technocentric vision 
of global environmental management (Watts, 1996: 22-30). 
It was no accident that the concept of sustainable development emerged when it did. 
Escobar argues that the idea of sustainable development must be seen as a new trend 
within capitalism where, alongside the traditional exploitation of natural resources, the 
"sustainable management of capitalised nature" becomes necessary (Escobar, 1996: 47). 
This need arose out of the threat that capitalism posed to its own resource base or 
"conditions of production" and due to the challenge being posed by increasing public 
disquiet about environmental degradation (Escobar, 1996: 47). 
Escobar argues that the notion of "managing the environment" that was put forward by the 
1987 Brundtland Report was very significant. Through this discourse, says Escobar, nature 











put in economic terms ("sound ecology is good economics") signified the symbolic death 
of nature (Escobar, 1996: 52). Environmental reformism seeks to reconcile environmental 
protection with economic development without undermining the market system (Escobar, 
1996: 49-50). The discourse of sustainable development then, according to Escobar, 
carries with it very specific social, political, economic, and cultural interests. 
Who is this 'we' who knows what is best for the world as a whole? Once again, we 
find the familiar figure of the white male Western scientist-turned-manager ... the 
benevolent hand of the West should save the earth; the Fathers of the World Bank, 
mediated by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the matriarch-scientist, and the few 
cosmopolitan Third Worlders who made it to the World Commission, will· 
reconcile 'humankind' with 'nature'. It is still the Western scientist that speaks for 
the Earth (Escobar, 1996: 50) . 
. In the late 1980's the World Bank embraced the concept of sustainable development. 
Criticising the top-down approach of modernisation the Bank argued for a new orientation 
towards "capacity-building, grassroots participation, decentralisation and sound 
environmental practices" (quoted in Peet and Watts, 1996: 17-18). Peet and Watts argue 
that this marks a sophisticated shift of development discourse. The history of development 
policy since the 1940's shifted from an emphasis on state planning and state involvement 
to debt-fed development, and in the 1980's to an emphasis on the integration of 
"developing" countries into the global market through export-oriented commodity 
production (peet and Watts, 1996: 20). 
Prompted by considerable grassroots resistance and the emergence of 'people's power' in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Africa, the Philippines, and India, a new discourse 











of empowerment and civil society. What has made it possible for leading capitalist 
institutions like the World Bank to appropriate the language and models of the struggles 
,and movements which oppose them, is the new neo-liberal confidence and free-market 
triumphal ism that followed the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the decline of 
many collective movements. It is in a cultural climate of growing individualism and self-
interest that capitalism can focus on the needs and interests of ordinary people at a local 
level and much of this is articulated in the ambiguous discourse of sustainable 
development (peet and Watts, 1996: 24-27). It is within this broad political and economic 
discourse of sustainable development, that environmental economics and environmental 
reformism seek to reconcile capitalist economic growth with sound ecology. 
3.4 'BUSINESS AS USUAL' WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 
The discipline of environmental economics grew out of the attempt by neo-classical 
economics to incorporate environmental protection into its discipline. Rather than question 
the role of capitalism in causing environmental degradation, environmental economists 
argue that the "invisible hand" of the free-market needs to embrace the natural 
environment in order to better protect it. Nature must be turned into a commodity with a 
market value in order for human society to value, and not abuse it (Panayotou, 1987). 
Barbour points to the failure of the market to properly value environmental goods and 
services as the basic reason for their severe exploitation. It is argued that people do not 
approach environmental goods and services as rational consumers. In order for people to 











commodities - goods and services with a monetary value and with well-defined and 
transferable property rights (Barbour, 1992). 
Environmental economics incorporates environmental protection into its market model 
without questioning the role of capitalist accumulation in creating environmental problems 
(Gare, 1995: 75). The neo-classical free-market model does not recognise the existence of 
structural social inequality. For this reason, its attempts to value the environment in the 
interests of sustainability, conflict with the reality of social and economic inequality. For 
example, the willingness-to-pay method of attaching a monetary value to environmental 
goods and services ignores the fact that "the rich are unlikely to give up an amenity 'at any 
price' whereas the poor who are least able to sustain the loss are likely to sacrifice it for a 
trifling sum" (Harvey, 1996: 368). Furthermore, from an ecological perspective, 'lhis way 
of pursuing monetary valuations tends to break down ... when we view the environment as 
being constructed organically, ecosystemically, or dialectically rather than as a Cartesian 
machine with replaceable parts" (Harvey, quoted in Foster, 1995b: 30). 
Following Escobar's argument that capitalist interests are able to accommodate the 
pressure of the environmental movement by capitalising nature through environmental 
management (Escobar, 1996: 47), we can find numerous ways in which big business is 
turning the global environmental crisis to profitable ends. Harvey refers to an article in a 
1995 issue of the Economist which celebrates a growing alliance between business and 
ecologists. The article was entitled, "How to make lots of money and save the planet too." 











championing biodiversity for commercial gam, opens up the prospect of a deeper 
commodification and pillaging of natural resources (Harvey, 1996: 381). 
. It is easy to be impressed with some of the strict environmental legislation that exists in 
some of the developed capitalist countries, but a global perspective shows how these states 
are exporting unsustainability through the unbridled exploitation of raw materials in 
underdeveloped countries and by sending their toxic waste across the seas (pearce, 1989: 
45). This "toxic colonialism" has seen underdeveloped countries bidding against one 
another in an effort to sell their "sink capacity" for foreign currency (Harvey, 1996: 368). 
Furthermore, the green technologies that have become a hugely profitable enterprise for 
capital in North America, Western Europe, and Japan, are not as altruistic as they might 
appear to be. These technologies, which have been developed as a result of strict 
environmental regulations and the high cost of litigation in pollution cases, largely offer 
end-of-pipe solutions. This means that they have been designed to clean up a mess rather 
than prevent it in the first place. Often the mess, in the form of hazardous waste, gets 
dumped near to impoverished minority communities or exported to underdeveloped 
countries desperately seeking foreign currency (pratt and Montgomery, 1997). 
The green technology industry in developed countries is trying to expand out of its home 
market. Hot on the heels of the severe environmental problems that development has 
caused in the Third World, come companies offering to sell technology to clean up the 











formulation of environmental regulations in the Third World so that the green technology 
will be in demand (pratt and Montgomery, 1997). In the same way that missionaries and 
anthropologists were once used as the unwitting ambassadors of colonial expansion, we 
might now find that environmental ma~gers open up the market for the expansion of 
green imperialism into underdeveloped countries. 
Environmental economics offers little in its commitment to sustainable development. Its 
abstract model of the free-market ignores fundamental economic, social, and political 
inequalities, and its methods for valuing environmental goods and services reduce 
ecological complexity to discrete entities and straitjacket these into purely utilitarian 
assessments. More fundamentally however, in its very effort to translate nature into 
monetary values, environmental economics places cost-benefit criteria at the centre of its 
concern a guiding principle which cannot offer any consistent commitment to sound 
ecological practice. As Foster argues, 
the irony in turning to the economics of sustainable development - in its dominant 
formulation - for a solution to the environmental problem is that it continues to see 
human freedom and progress as synonymous with the instrumentalist organisation 
of human beings as self-serving, possessive individualists, even though this is the 
principle source of environmental destruction in our society (Foster, 1995b: 30). 
In its effort to translate our human relation to nature into monetary valuations, 
environmental economics offers the clearest expression of an alienated disregard for our 











3.5 ENVIRONMENTAL REFORMISM 
The technocratic discourse of sustainable development cannot be reduced to its cynical 
appropriation by business interests. The environmental reformism of conservationists, 
green organisations, environmental scientists, non-governmental organisations, and a 
variety of international agencies, is often at odds with environmental economics. 
Environmental reformism assumes that society's abuse of the environment is due 
primarily to ignorance and attitude, and it therefore concentrates on seeking to raise 
environmental awareness in government, business,and among the public at large. This 
work, connected as it is to progressive scientific research and practice, has been in the 
forefront of legislative reform, environmental protection, pollution control, enlightened 
business practice, and a growing popular environmental awareness. While this work is 
realistic" in the sense of engaging the powers that be and forcing concessions from them, it 
lacks a deeper political and socio-economic critique and assumes that capitalism and 
sustainable development are compatible. 
Harvey (1996) argues that the general approach of environmental management (and here 
he includes environmental economics, environmental engineering, and environmental law) 
to environmental problems is to intervene after the event. Environmental problems are 
therefore regarded as mistakes that need to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In a 
similar spirit, preference is given to remedial (end-of-pipe) solutions rather than "pre-











reveals a more or less complete accommodation to the ''basic rights of private property 
and profit maximisation" (Harvey, 1996: 375). 
Most of the efforts of environmental reformism, like other attempts to defend basic human 
rights in the face of neo-liberalism, is defensive work. But this important defensive work 
can only take on its fuller meaning if it looks beyond remedial measures towards more 
long term solutions, as unrealistic as they might seem, and if it develops some consistency 
between its reform programme and that grander vision. However much the struggle for· 
environmental reform has advanced in the last ten years, it faces an increasingly hostile 
environment. The global economy of the 1990's is characterised by increasing 
privati sat ion, deregulation, the export of manufacturing industry to low-wage and low-cost 
environments in the Third World, structural adjustment programmes, mobility of capital, 
and a growing culture of competitive individualism. Not only are social and environmental 
problems multiplying, but the traditional forms of regulation over capital are increasingly 
being dismantled by neo-liberal governments. The growing climate of ''free-market 
triumphalism" (Escobar, 1996) is hardly encouraging for proponents of environmental 
reformism and especially not for those who pin their hopes on big business' sense of 
social and environmental responsibility. 
Although armed with scientific legitimacy environmental reformism can easily be 
accommodated by powerful economic and political interests that are essentially hostile to 
it. Enlightened technocrats in the World Bank do not find it difficult to incorporate 











absence of a more radical political perspective within the environmental reform movement 
leaves it open to co-option by the very interests it is trying to challenge. As Sachs argues: 
As governments, business and international agencies raise the banner of global 
ecology, environmentalism changes its face. In part, ecology - understood as the 
philosophy of a social movement - is about to transform itself from a knowledge 
of opposition to a knowledge of domination .... In the process, environmentalism 
becomes sanitised of its radical content and reshaped as expert neutral knowledge 
(quoted in Harvey, 1996: 383) 
3.6 THE IMPOSSmILITY OF SUSTAINABLE CAPITALISM 
The technocentric politics of sustainable development come up against all kinds of 
contradictions in the practice of promoting environmental protection within the existing 
capitalist system. In general, capital will only support environmental research and 
implement environmentally-sound practices when it is in its .own business interests to do 
so. More specifically, capital sees natural conditions instrumentally as economic resources 
that can facilitate profit-making; it is relatively blind to constraints that it cannot 
manipulate in its instrumental use of nature; and because costs are only measured in 
property/money terms it is more or less indifferent to cumulative impacts on ecological 
processes (Castree, 1995: 25). 
While big business will always make gestures towards public opinion, these are inevitably 
cost-benefit decisions rather than fundamental ethical transformations. Polluter-pays 
practices can be enforced in this or that case, but there is no way in which capitalism can 
function on the principle of internalising costs. Perhaps the most idealistic feature of 
sustainable development discourse is the expectation that we are guided by some ethic of 











resources in the interests of future generations cannot be taken seriously in light of the fact 
that we deprive millions of our present generation of any access to adequate means of 
survival (Soper, 1995: 259-62). 
Just as capitalism inherently generates poverty amongst human beings, so it systematically 
"gnaws away at the natural resource base which sustains it" (pepper, 1993: 92). Without 
denying the defensive value of environmental reformism, I would argue that sustainable 
development is not compatible with capitalism, and that to be a meaningful objective its 
proponents needs to acknowledge that incompatibility politically . 
. Such a political shift requires a recognition of the fundamentally flawed economic and 
cultural framework through which we relate to nature. We need to step back from the 
arrogance of positivism and pragmatism to appreciate that our utilitarian and 
instrumentalist conception of nature, as some external object to be either abused, 
commodified, or managed, grows out of a very specific cultural tradition. And that 
tradition, as much as it presents itself as an objective rational matter-of-fact discourse, 
expresses a condition of human alienation that has been born out of capitalist social 
relations. It takes private property, production for profit, the laws of the market, -class 
inequality, gender differences, and a range of other historically specific relationships as 
given and as part of some 'natural' order. 
Over the last four decades there has emerged in the advanced capitalist countries of the 











economic development. It is to the philosophical perspective of deep ecology, a dominant 
voice within the broader ecocentric tradition that has come to challenge mainstream 
. technocentric environmentalism, that I now tum. In the following chapter I argue that 
although ecocentrism offers a progressive critique oftechnocentrism's commodification of 












Notes to Chapter 3 
i This is a critical characterisation of reformist environmentalism, offered mainly by deep 
ecologists. 
ii The objective of sustainable development is subscribed to by a wide range of 
environmental perspectives and as such carries various meanings. In this chapter I am 
only concerned with the technocentric discourse of sustainable development. 
iii The concept of 'wilderness' is drawn from the North American cultural experience. It 
can be usefully applied, as I argue in this chapter, to many contexts where colonial 
. conquest and settler expansion involved the taming and domestication of land, animals, 
and indigenous people (Beinhart and Coates, 1995; Cronon, 1995). 
iv Without exploring the issue, we need to acknowledge that there are many debates 
within Christianity with regard to the meaning of the biblical reference to man's 
dominion over nature. While some views emphasis human domination over the rest of 
nature, there is also a softer notion of human stewardship or caring for other living things. 
v Refers to the philosophical traditions established by Rene Descartes, the I? century 
philosopher. His philosophy consolidated the growing Western perception of a dualism 
between mind and matter. Cartesianism was also rigidly deterministic, arguing that the 
behaviour of all living organisms followed the laws of mechanical physics. 
vi My critique of the concept of wilderness and its place in our contemporary relation to 
our natural environment is not to suggest that experiences of relatively unspoilt nature are 
not emotionally and spiritually important for human beings. In order to challenge our 
condition of alienation we must address the heart as much as the mind. New knowledge 
about nature and ecological processes as well as sensitising experiences in the wilderness 
are a necessary part of undoing our estrangement from our natural environment and 
developing a sense of our ecological place in the world. By learning to appreciate nature 
we can overcome the oppositions and dualisms in our lives. Since our life-work as a 
species is to make a home in nature, we must seek to establish an ecologically sensitive 
continuum between our lived environments and wilderness. One of the most valuable 
environmental project in South Africa today is the Working for Water Programme which, 
in employing thousands of unemployed people to cut down alien vegetation, has helped 












I am working so that there will be more water. Those trees, they drink a lot of 
water. I wish this project can continue because it provides jobs for us. Because of 
this project we have learned to appreciate our flora and our mountains and we are 
able to teach the community about the dangers imposed on our indigenous plants 
by plant invaders. It is good and healthy in the mountain. I have never 
experienced it before (Working For Water Newsletter, 1998). 
vii Although conservationism in North America and South Africa is still a strong tradition 
within contemporary environmentalism, the latter does depart from its more conservative 
predecessor in two important respects. Firstly, conservation was traditionally concerned 
with the protection of single species whereas contemporary environmentalism is more 
oriented towards habitat protection and sustaining biodiversity. This is the result of the 
development of the science of ecology and our greater appreciation of the complexity and 
interdependence of the natural world. Secondly, conservationism has traditionally 
conceived of wilderness as exclusive of people. Contemporary environmentalism, 
embracing as it does the emergence of ecotourism, is shifting more towards including 
people within protected wilderness areas. 
viii This refers to the late 18th century and early 19th century philosophical and artistic 
revolt against classicism and the celebration of the awe-inspiring majesty of nature. 
ix It is hard to resist reproducing a quotation from an early 20th century novel about the 
transformation of California by the railroad. In the following extract the author, believe it 
or not, is talking about the first use of the plough on arable land. 
It was the long stroking caress, vigorous, male,powerful, for which the earth 
seemed panting. The heroic embrace of a multitude of iron hands, gripping deep 
into the brown, warm flesh of the land that quivered responsive and passionate 
under this rude advance, so robust as to be almost an assault, so violent as to be 
veritably brutal. There, under the sun and under thespeckless sheen of the sky, 
the wooing of the Titan began, the vast primal passion, the two world-forces, the 
elemental Male and Female, locked in a colossal embrace, at grapples (sic) in the 
throes of an infinite desire, at once terrible and divine, knowing no law, untamed, 












NATURE AS A MORAL AUTHORITY: A CRITIQUE OF 
ECOCENTRIC ENVIRONMENTALISM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to technocentric environmentalism, ecocentrism defines itself in opposition to 
human-centred utilitarian approaches to nature. The ecocentric tradition and discourse 
includes deep ecology, eco-feminism, many green political parties, animal rights groups, 
a range of radical eco-socialist and eco-anarchist tendencies, as well as conservative and 
eco-fascist groupings (Pepper, 1993: 34~ 47). What this variety shares is a strong form of 
naturalism, a bio-ethic that regards humans as one species amongst many but without any 
special privilege (Benton, 1993: 24). The bio-egalitarianism that defines ecocentrism, 
seeks to accord rights to all living things and to model human society on the natural 
ecosystems with which it coexists and on which it depends (Spretnak, 1984: 233). 
Ecocentric are broadly opposed to all anthropocentric, or humanist, perspectives, be they 
derived from Judeo-Christian religious traditions, Cartesian philosophy and SCIence, 
neoclassical economics, or Marxism. 
The discussion in this chapter focuses in particular on deep ecology - a dominant bio-
egalitarian perspective and discourse. My critique of deep ecology centres on the 
argument that although its philosophical perspective and political vision articulates a 
challenge to our contemporary human estrangement from nature, its idealisation of nature 
is at the same time an expression of alienated thinking (Dickens, 1992: 84). While 











utilitarian object, deep ecology expresses that same dualism through a romantic 
reification of nature - not nature as a commodity, but nature as an embodiment of our lost 
,human capacities and ideals (Quigley, 1992: 300). 
At the heart of the ecocentric perspective is a romantic delusion - a delusion that it 
speaks on nature's behalf and that it is therefore less anthropocentric than the humanism 
that it criticises (Dickens, 1992: 159). Deep ecology philosophy and politics projects very 
specific human values onto nature (such as harmony and balance) but asserts that these 
are principles of nature. This 'nature' that is invoked as a moral authority and as a set of 
objective measures against which human society should be judged, is in fact ideologically 
and culturally constructed (Cronon, 1995: 20-25). 
It is on the basis of this expression of alienated romantic thought that the political 
idealism of deep ecology emerges. It envisages the development of a co-operative, 
egalitarian, and ecologically-friendly human society - a transformation that will come 
about through a process of self-realisation and an "organic maturation" of human 
consciousness and attitude (Frodeman, 1992; Spretnak, 1984). The social relations that 
give rise to our estrangement from, and abuse of, nature and that inhibit any collective 
spiritual renewal, grounded as they are in the economic and political organisation of 
human society, are not however addressed by the politics of deep ecology. This political 
idealism expresses the paralysis of alienated thought in its inability to connect with the 











I begin this chapter with a general outline of the contribution that deep ecology has made 
to environmental thought. I then explore how deep ecology's romantic idealisation of 
nature and its establishment of nature as a moral authority over human society, expresses 
a human/nature dualism characteristic of an alienated regard for our natural environment. 
A central aspect of the perspective of deep ecology is its opposition to anthropocentric 
environmental thought which I explore in relation to contemporary Marxist proposals for 
a more ecologically-sound humanism in our relationship with nature. Following this I 
include a short discussion of eco-feminism's romantic association of womankind with 
nature in order to separate out idealist and materialist perspectives on gender oppression 
in contemporary social relations. I conclude the chapter with a critique of the idealist 
politics that flow from deep ecology's philosophical perspective. 
4.2 THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEEP ECOLOGY 
My critique of deep ecology first considers the significant ways in which its ecocentrism 
departs scientifically, philosophically, ethically, and politically from the utilitarian 
tradition of Cartesian thought and technocentric environmentalism. Deep ecology 
constitutes a dominant radical tradition within the environmental movement. There 'are 
four features of its contribution that define it in opposition to technocentric 
environmentalism. 
Firstly, deep ecology connects strongly to progressive innovations within Western 











worldview to that of relational ecological thinking (Capra, 1996: x). Broadly 
characterised as "systems theory", this emerging new scientific and philosophical 
. perspective draws on quantum physics, ecology, organismic biology, process philosophy, 
cybernetics, systems management, cognitive immunology, and linguistic theory (Capra, 
1996: x). While deep eeology draws strongly on this new paradigm, the new science'of 
ecology does not automatically suggest ecocentric philosophies, morals, and politics. Our 
growing scientific understanding of ecosystems and our relationship to them, has 
contributed more broadly to changing attitudes and perspectives within the broader 
environmental movement. For example, ecological science has also given scientific 
substance to Marxist dialectics as a framework for understanding living systems (Parsons, 
1977). 
The second important contribution of deep ecology is its emphasis on holism - a 
philosophical perspective which emphasises the integrity of whole living systems. This is 
philosophically integral to systems theory as it seeks to bring together what Western 
mechanistic scientific and philosophical traditions have disintegrated. As a scientific, 
spiritual, ethical, and social paradigm, ecocentric holism seeks to challenge the alienated, 
dislocated, and fragmented experience and world view that characterises capitalist social 
relations and culture (Capra, 1996: 19-22). An important aspect of this holistic 
perspective is its emphasis on process and on the inter-relatedness of phenomena, as 











Thirdly, in its search for a new age of harmony, unity, and egalitarianism, deep ecology 
draws on a range of cultural and political traditions that give it a politically critical 
perspective, Radical ecology movements in the United States grew up alongside the civil 
rights, anti-war, and counter-culture movements of the 1960's. Distinct from the Marxist 
challenge of capitalism and from Marxist politics of class struggle, radical ecology 
offered a broad critique of industrial society, materialistic values, technology, and 
consumerism, and developed a vision of a collective spiritual and cultural renewal 
(Zimmerman, 1994: 57-69). 
During the 1970's this politically radical counter-culture gave way to the New Age 
emphasis on spirituality, self-realisation, and individual transformation. While deep 
ecologists reject much of the humanism of New Age-ism, there is a considerable shared 
philosophical leaning towards Eastern philosophy and traditional (particularly North 
American) spiritual practices (Zimmermafl., 1994: 69-73). In the 1980's the emergence of 
the New Paradigm perspective out of New Age culture, marked a shift away from the 
latter's spiritual individualism and towards the science of ecology and systems-thinking. 
Capra, as an exponent of the New Paradigm perspective, sees the present global crisis of 
the environment and humanity as precipitating a collective and organic maturation of 
human consciousness (paradigm shift) which will usher in a socially and ecologically 
harmonious era (Zimmerman, 1994: 74-89). While I argue in this chapter that the politics 
of deep ecology is idealistic and rooted in alienated thinking, its broad radical critique of 
the alienated social relations and culture of modem capitalist society expresses an 











Lastly, deep ecology places a strong moral emphasis on the inherent value of all forms of 
life. Whatever problems exist with what has been called "ecocentric moralising" (Benton, 
1992), the ethical stance of deep ecology challenges us to revive our human sensibilities 
and sensitivities towards life in all its forms - a challenge which, I will argue, requires 
not only a change of attitude but a fundamental reorganisation of the economic, political, 
and social relations that generate our alienation from nature. 
Thus deep ecology, as a leading expression of ecocentrism, draws on science, religion, 
philosophy, and politics to present a broad critique of contemporary society and our 
relation to nature. But while deep ecology challenges the utilitarian humanism of 
technocentric environmentalism (which it calls "shallow ecology")(Capra, 1996: 7), its 
own idealisation of nature reflects the same dualistic thinking that undialectically and a- . 
historically separates humans from the rest of nature. This philosophical perspective, I 
argue, prevents deep ecology from coming to terms with the changing historical forms of 
human relations with nature and therefore forces it to mislocate the problem of 
environmental degradation politically (Soper, 1995: 19). Rather than addressing the 
economic, political and social relations that historically determine our human relation to 
nature, deep ecology relies on humans changing their attitudes and consciousness. In 
detaching human ideas from the social reality that produces them, deep ecology politics 
(as with any form of political idealism) can only take effect amongst the intellectual 
middle class whose relative economic and social mobility allows them the privilege of 











4.3 DEEP ECOLOGY'S IDEALISATION OF NATURE AS AN EXPRESSION OF 
ALIENATED THOUGHT 
. At the heart of ecocentrism is the ideological construction of nature as "wholly pure and 
unsullied by the interference of human beings" (Dickens, 1992: 159). This kind of 
romantic idealisation and yearning for authenticity reflects the human need to overcome 
the insecurity and estrangement that capitalist social relations have nurtured. Deep 
ecology's reification of nature involves setting it up as a force that is separate from 
huma!). social existence -it involves "giving something that is socially mediated a life of 
its own" (Dickens, 1992: 84) . 
. This process of fetishising nature denies the long history of material and cultural 
interaction of humans with nature and the fact that there is little of nature that can today 
be regarded as pristine. It sets up an essential opposition between a pure, balanced nature 
on the one hand and human society on the other, rather than appreciating the dialectical 
interaction between the impact of natural processes on human society and the human 
socialisation of nature (Cronon, 1995: 24-25). 
Deep ecology's reification of nature is part of a broader romantic tradition that dresses 
nature up in human morality - nature can be an authentic sublime experience or a 
malevolent vengeful force (Cronon, 1995: 50). Regarding the former, giving nature a life 
of its own, separate from our social construction of nature and our complex engagement 
with it, often establishes nature as an idealised object of yearning and inspiration - a 











popular commercial version in the pursuit of the natural and authentic through green 
consumerism and·health foods (Dickens, 1992: 159-60). 
Alternatively, nature reified can be seen as a hostile vengeful force. Research carried out 
in Britain has shown that many people fear that nature will exact revenge for our human 
disregard for our natural environment. Dickens argues that this feeling of helplessness in 
relation to the irrational forces of nature is a projection of peoples' feelings of social 
anxiety and loss of control over their lives, where ''feelings and insecurities about 
relations within the social world are ... transferred to an understanding of people's 
relations with the natural world" (Dickens, 1992: 175). 
As part of this romantic tradition, deep ecology presents nature as everything that is other 
than human, a kind of pristine otherness. While deep ecology's idealisation of nature 
reflects an important human need and aspiration, it sets up humans in opposition to nature 
- not as a specific historical situation, but as an essential relation (Soper, 1995: 18). A 
central feature of this dualism established by deep ecology, is its tendency to regard all 
human intervention in the natural environment as inherently devaluing an anti-
humanism that, if taken seriously, effectively disempowers human society from using its 
humanity to transform its relations with nature (Soper, 1995: 19). It is to deep ecology's 
ambivalence towards the responsibilities of human society in transforming its relations 











4.4 DEEP ECOLOGY'S CRITIOUE OF HUMANISM 
Deep ecology, and other ecocentric perspectives, emerged In opposition to the 
anthropocentric assumptions of traditional Western philosophy. As the deep ecologist 
Charlene Spretnak argues: 
Green politics rejects the anthropocentric orientation of humanism, a philosophy 
which posits that humans have the ability to confront and solve the many 
problems we face by applying human reason and by rearranging the natural world 
and the interactions of men and women so that human life will prosper. We need 
only consider the proportions of the environmental crisis today to realise the 
dang~rous self-deception contained in both religious and secular humanism. It is 
hubris to declare that humans are the central figures of life on earth and that we 
are in control. In the long run, nature is in controL (Spretnak, 1984: 234). 
The fact that Spretnak calls on us, as humans, to "consider" and "realise", suggests that it 
can only be through a very conscious human act that we can reconstruct our relation to 
nature. As Tolman argues, "humans have created the problems, they are human problems, 
and humans will solve them. There is no other way to view these matters except through 
human experience conditioned by human history, and in terms of human values" 
(Tolman, 1991: 73). This is not a humanist preference but an existential fact, since 'lhere 
is no escape from the human standpoint because it is the only standpoint available to 
us ... it is exactly the human standpoint that gives rise to ethical issues" (Raila and Levins, 
1992: 238). As Spretnak continues her argument, the necessity for a human solution to a 
. human-made problem is made more explicit: 
Our goal is for human society to operate in a learning mode and to cultivate 
biocentric wisdom. Such wisdom entails a sophisticated understanding of how the 
natural world - including us - works ... holistic, or ecological, thinking is not a 
retreat from reason; it is an enlargement of it to more comprehensive and hence 











The problem with the ecocentric critique of humanism however, is that it often suggests 
that our arrogant anthropocentrism is an essential part of human nature - that human 
. nature is inherently destructive (Soper, 1995: 18). So while on the one hand deep ecology 
calls on human society to exercise its human capacity to develop an ecological wisdom, 
on the other hand it denies that we have that capacity in its unqualified rejection of 
humanism. Soper argues that this confusion arises out of deep ecology's mislocation of 
the source of the problem of our relations with nature. Instead of identifying specific 
historical and social forms through which humans have abused nature (most significantly, 
capitalism), ecocentrics abstract from history to blame the environmental crisis on some 
essential inherent capacity of human beings to devalue nature (Soper, 1995: 19). 
Ecocentric arguments seek resolution to this contradiction by shifting the emphasis away 
from our human responsibility and capacity to change our relation to nature, towards an 
assertion of nature's objective rights. Aside from the fact that it requires a human process 
to acknowledge the intrinsic value and rights of all living things, the attempt by deep 
ecology to take the standpoint of nature creates even more problems than it solves. 
Grundmann argues that for ecocentrics to speak on behalf of nature requires all kinds of 
projections onto nature of human values and choices (Grund mann, 1991 i. Ecocentrism in 
this respect can only be deceptive, because even in claiming to take nature's standpoint 
humans will inevitably make human judgements and distinctions about what is valuable 
in nature and what is not (Soper, 1995: 256-9). It is unlikely that malaria-carrying 
mosquitoes or life-threatening viruses will be given the same respect and the same rights 











A number of ecological Marxists and radical ecocentrics have sought to resolve this 
ecocentric/humanist stand-off by exploring a more ecologically progressive humanism. 
Benton argues for a "richer anthropocentrism" which recognises our essential human 
need for emotional and spiritual intimacy with nature. That appreciation, he argues, is not 
simply human subjectivity - it arises out of an interaction between an objective nature 
and our appreciation of it. We form our appreciation through our interaction with and 
upon nature, and through our familiarity and understanding of it. Our values and 
sensibilities are human-made, but, argues Benton, what we value is contained within 
nature itself - its inherent value (Benton, 1992: 71-3). 
Similarily, Eckersley argues that we can both admit that our views and values are human 
and at the same time attach value to nature that is not simply about human utilitarian 
gain. This requires that humans do not seek to totally domesticate nature but rather 
recognise its relative autonomy and grant other forms of nature their independence and 
freedom (Eckersley, 1996: 273-82). Haila and Levins suggest that we can overcome the 
opposition between our need to utilise nature and our desire to respect nature through 
ethical principles that "grow from the realisation that nature is an internal prerequisite of 
human life and culture, and humans need to respect the general potential of life in nature. 












Marxist and humanist arguments for a richer anthropocentrism should have no dispute 
with deep ecology's call for the development of ecological wisdom in our material.and 
spiritual dealings with nature. But for deep ecology to present this challenge as other than 
a profoundly human one only serves to remove our human responsibility for making this 
kind of change possible. Taking nature into a more mystical terrain of inherent value that 
is somehow detached from our human interaction with it, only serves to reinforce the 
alienation that deep ecology seeks to overcome. We can certainly move away from the 
arrogance of utilitarian anthropocentrism that characterises capitalist social relations, but 
the human endeavour of developing a richer appreciation of our specific human 
experience of being part-of and apart-from-nature, requires more humanism rather than 
less. As Soper argues: 
We are inevitably compromised in our dealings with nature in the sense that we 
cannot hope to live in the world without distraining on its resources, without 
bringing preferences to it that are shaped by our own concerns and conceptions of· 
its worth, and hence without establishing a certain structure of priorities in regard 
to its use ... A11 the same, we can certainly be more or less aware of the 
compromise, more or less pained by it, and more or less sensitive to the patterning 
of the bonds and separations that it imposes .... Rather than becoming awe-struck 
by nature, we need perhaps to become more stricken by the ways in which our 
dependency upon its resources involves us irremediably in certain forms of 
detachment from it. To get 'closer' to nature is, in a sense, to experience more 
anxiety about all those ways in which we cannot finally identify with it nor it with 
us. But in that very process, of course, we would also be transforming our sense 
of human identity (Soper, 1995: 277-8). 
The value of the ecocentric critique of anthropocentrism lies in its challenge to human 
society to move away from a purely utilitarian humanism towards ecological wisdom. 
This challenge from deep ecology "presumes the possession by human beings of 
attributes that set them apart from all other forms of life" (Soper 1995: 160). This human 











assertion of nature's objective rights. It is through human distinctiveness that we have 
historically abused our natural environment and given priority to utilitarian human 
interests, and it is only through that same human capacity that we can develop an 
ecologically-wise humanism and reshape our relation to nature. 
4.5 IDEALISM AND MATERIALISM IN ECO-FEMINISM 
Ecofeminism has played an important part in deepening and extending ecocentric 
philosophy and politics through its critique of the patriarchal practices, attitudes, values, 
and discourse of modernity. However, much of this critique is also directed against deep 
ecology, insofar as the latter does not necessarily embrace a gender analysis of the 
anthropocentrism that it opposes. Although there are many different tendencies within 
eco-feminism, they share a rejection of patriarchy's historical domination over women 
and nature (Zimmerman, 1994: 278). 
Within what is known as "essentialist" eco-feminism, an intimate spiritual bond is seen to 
exist between women and nature. This bond, it is argued, arises partly out of their shared 
oppression, but also through a biological determinism that gives women, with their 
reproductive role, a particular closeness to nature. "'Non-essentialist" eco-feminists, 
disagree with this romantic formulation (Mellor, 1996: 251-2). They argue that gender is 
a social construct and that women's reproductive role (apart from the physicality of 
childbirth) is not naturally determined. To argue for some privileged natural or spiritual 
relation that women have with nature is to collaborate in relegating women to the 











Women's particular experiences in the work of reproduction is not an essentialist ideal 
. but a material reality. It is through cultural attitudes ("cultural eco-feminism") or 
patriarchal social relations ("socialist ecofeminism") that women have been forced into 
reproductive work. Women's particular intimacy with nature, as a material reality, is not 
just associated with motherhood and nurturing. Traditional gender divisions of labour in 
most parts of the world, reinforced as these have been by capitalist social relations, have 
forced upon women a particular combination of productive and reproductive work 
(Mellor, 1996: 257) - raising children, fetching water, collecting firewood, and 
subsistence agriculture. This experience is profoundly significant in giving women a 
close relation with their natural environment and a particular awareness of the struggle 
for access to resources. There can indeed be spiritual dimensions·to this experience, just 
as men's relative distance from such work also has its emotional and psychological 
impact and expression. While it is important politically to recognise the specific 
ecological sensitivity that women often develop through their productive and 
reproductive work, to imply some natural women-nature bond (as appealing as it might 
sound) is as much a social construction as is the oppressive patriarchal abuse of women 
and nature. 
4.6 THE IDEALIST POLITICS OF DEEP ECOLOGY 
A central feature of deep ecology and other ecocentric views is their more or less direct 
extension of ecological principles into a political, cultural, and spiritual framework for an 











ecological principles that are identified as offering guidelines for human social and 
political organisation are presented as uncomplicated objective prescriptions from nature 
rather than the ideological formulation that they are. Secondly, the emphasis of ecocentric 
politics on spiritual conversion and changing human perceptions and values ignores the 
material basis and social structures that give rise to these attitudes·. Thirdly, while any 
radical politics must embrace a normative vision that is ideological and value-based, it 
must also connect with real social conditions and struggles. Ecocentric visions tend to 
stand aloof from the reality of the majority of humankind and do not offer more than 
promises of a kind of organic maturation of human consciousness as the means to realise 
ecological wisdom (Capra, 1996; Quigley, 1992). These three expressions of idealism 
. within ecocentric politics, which I explore below, grow out of' its character as a 
specifically romantic expression of alienated thought. 
Regarding the first problem in deep ecology politics, Capra's book The Web of Life 
applies contemporary ecological thinking to social and political issues (Capra, 1996). He 
argues for an "ecological literacy" through which we can develop an understanding of the 
principles of organisation of ecological communities and use those principles to create 
sustainable human communities (Capra, 1996: 289). The specific principles that he 
suggests we can draw from the wisdom of nature include: a recognition of the necessity 
for interdependence since sustainable ecosystems teach· us the value of nourishing 
multiple relationships; the importance of cyclical processes and feedback loops as a basis 
for sustainable use of resources; the importance of partnership and co-operation as 











diversity and adapt to change in the way that ecosystems do (Capra, 1994: 290-2). 
Similarily, Spretnak suggests: 
Deep ecology encompasses the study of nature's subtle web of interrelated 
processes and the application of that study to our interactions with nature and 
among ourselves .... Human systems may take from nature lessons concerning 
interdependence, diversity, openness to change with a system, flexibility and the 
ability to adapt to new events or conditions outside the system (Spretnak, 1984: 
233). 
Haila and Levins argue that the slogans and discourse offered by deep ecology politics 
are strongly misleading. Ecology they say, "does not give us prescriptions; all rules 
apparently derived from nature are ideological and political and should stand on their 
own without claiming endorsement from nature" (Hail a and Levins, 1992: x). A political 
programme which suggests that nature directs us towards harmony, balance, feminine 
nurturing, co-operation, diversity, adaptation, complexity, flexibility, and small scale 
sustainability is extremely appealing. But it must be propagated and recognised as a 
human programme and not as one prescribed by nature. Each claim about nature is an 
ideological statement due to its partial truth. Alternative, and less appealing principles, 
argue Haila and Levins, can equally well be drawn from nature dispensibility of 
species, competition, non-uniqueness, instability, conflict, and extinction (Haila and 
Levins, 1992: 2-7). 
As attractive as specific ecological principles might be in our imagined construction of an 
alternative society, the extension of systems-thinking into social relations is very 
problematic politically. Its emphasis on interrelationships, balance, self-repair, and self-











(capitalist) society as a natural organism with its own internal ways of correcting 
deviation (Dickens, 1992). This extension of ecosystems thinking into social relations is 
not just politically conservative, it is also fundamentally misleading. It is precisely our 
unique human capacity for self-reflection.and therefore for making history, that allows us 
to transcend biological determinism. It is through that capacity that we have alienated 
ourselves from nature, and it is through that capacity that we can humanly reshape our 
relation to our natural environment. 
The second problem with deep ecology politics is that it seeks to address people's ideas 
rather than their social and material reality. Deep ecology is fundamentally concerned 
with changing people's attitudes, perceptions, and values. Capra argues that the vast array 
of social and environmental problems facing us today are 'just different facets of one 
single crisis, which is largely a crisis of perception" (Capra, 1996: 4). He goes on to 
argue that the development of deep ecological awareness is a spiritual process which, 
while drawing on a variety of religious traditions, basically involves the discovery or 
realisation that the human self and nature are one. This, Capra argues, is the "grounding 
of deep ecology" (Capra, 1996: 11). This self-realisation lies at the heart of the radical 
environmental vision - the basis for constructing a new society along ecological lines 
requires that the human self move away from its ego-centredness towards recognising its 
place within broader life-processes and thus towards a caring for others and for nature 
(Frodeman, 1992: 319). Spretnak likewise suggests that it is primarily through an inner 











The attention that deep ecology pays to human perceptions, attitudes, values, and 
spirituality - to the need for humans to overcome their alienation and reconstruct their 
identity in relation to all living things - is essential as a component of transformation. But 
the ecocentric emphasis on thought, attitude, and spirituality alone is hugely insufficient 
politically. The separation of humans from nature, the loss of biodiversity, the destruction 
of ecosystems, the thinning of the ozone layer, the depletion of natural resources, and the 
careless dumping of waste are not just the result of humans having the wrong attitude and 
ideas. What the idealism of deep ecology fails to examine are the social relationships and 
material practices which underlie the fragmentation of human experience, our alienation 
from nature, and the destructive behaviours and attitudes which result from that. While 
the adoption of alternative ways of thinking offers comfort to a minority of middle class 
people it does nothing on its own to challenge the material practices and social relations 
of capitalism (Dickens, 1996: 107). 
This idealistic individualism of deep ecology, which is also characteristic of New Age 
perspectives, can be profoundly conservative politically. It argues that people's happiness 
is determined by their attitudes and not by their material circumstances, and goes so far as 
to suggest that oppression is just a state of mind. Pepper argues that this pressure to 
''think yourself better off''' fits comfortably with neo-liberal individualistic culture 
(pepper, 1993: 141-2). Insofar as self-realisation encourages a rediscovery of spontaneity, 
intuitiveness, and the "wisdom of the wild", it tends progressively towards challenging 











contemporary neo-liberal contempt for collective social identity, purpose, and struggle, 
individual spiritual renewal has limited progressive capacity. As Quigley argues: 
The problem with such a view of resistance is that this structure partakes of what 
it opposes. The positing and centring of a unique and transcendent being that is 
linked to a natural realm is the structure employed by power systems; more 
immediately, it is also the basis for a free market society. The illusion of a free 
and unencumbered individual is currently at the centre of power (Quigley, 1992: 
298-9). 
My third critique of deep ecology's political idealism is its inability to connect its 
normative vision with contemporary social reality. Following the West German Green· 
Party slogan, ''we are neither left nor right; we are in front" (Spretnak, 1984: 232), deep 
ecology politics tends to stand aloof from social struggles and does not connect its 
political programme and vision with the diversity and commonality of the experiences 
and aspirations of ordinary people. 
The idealism of deep ecology's envisaged political process (self-realisation) is matched 
by a similar idealism in the goal towards which it strives. On the one hand this political 
goal bears similar features to the visions embraced by socialists and anarchists -
decentralisation, grassroots democracy, gender equality, cooperation, ecological wisdom, 
and an economy geared towards meeting people's needs as opposed to profit-making 
(Spretnak, 1984: 252). On the other hand deep ecology inclines towards resurrecting an 
imagined and idealised past, a "golden age of pristine wilderness" (Quigley, 1992: 300), 












Ecocentris~ and deep ecology In particular, has brought a valuable scientific and 
spiritual discourse into the environmental movement that challenges the philosophical 
dualism of traditional mechanistic thinking. At the same time however, deep ecology 
serves to express our alienated human condition through its reification of a pristine 
nature, its projection of an ideologically constructed bio-ethic onto human society, its 
recourse to individual self-realisation as a programme for transformation, and its 
romantic construction of an idealised lost state as its political and social goal. The 
positive contribution of ecocentrism lies indeed in its ability to contribute towards a new 
ecological wisdom that embraces scientific knowledge, a new sensibility towards the 
inherent value of nature, and a striving towards a fuller realisation of human capacities. 
Unless these perspectives are built into a political programme that seeks to connect with 
the reality and struggles of ordinary people, deep ecology is bound at best to provide an 











Notes to Chapter 4 
i The projection of human values onto nature is by no means unique to deep ecology. 
Soper argues that our endowment of nature with diverse human characteristics shows that 
we conceptualise this "other nature through a process of anthropomorphism, in which we 
project on to that which we are not, those very qualities and attitudes that we deem 
exclusive to humanity" (Soper, 1995: 71). In a less sympathetic fashion, the 19th century 
philosopher, Nietsche, challenged anthropomorphic projections onto nature by arguing, 
'<While you rapturously pose as deriving your law from nature, you want 
something quite the reverse of that, you strange actors and self-deceivers. Your 
pride wants to prescribe your morality, your ideal, to nature ... you would like to 
make all existence exist only after your own image ... this is an old and never-













THE PERSPECTIVE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous two chapters I argued that, notwithstanding the important pragmatic 
defensive work of environmental management and the valuable scientific and ethical 
contributions of deep ecology, technocentric and ecocentric environmentalist discourses 
remain trapped within the very philosophical and political framework that rationalises 
and reproduces our contemporary alienation from nature. While this human/nature 
dualism has a long history in Western philosophy and religion, capitalism, as an 
economic system and as a set of social relationships, has deepened our physical, cultural, 
and spiritual estrangement from nature. Yet even in challenging our contemporary abuse 
of our natural environment, both the technocentric and ecocentric perspectives express 
this alienation the first through its commodification of nature as a set of utilitarian 
resources, as a fenced-off wilderness, or as a recreational asset; the latter through its 
romanticisation of nature as a moral authority over human society. 
Although on the surface these two dominant environmentalist discourses stand opposed, 
they are philosophically and historically married to each other. In contrast to Marxism 
and to Eastern philosophy, technocentrism and ecocentrism abstract our historically and 
socially determined alienation from nature into a metaphysical relation. In spite of what 
either might recognise about our biological or ecological connection to nature, their 











technocentrism celebrates our human domination over nature, and ecocentrism laments it, 
both express and reproduce the same human/nature dualism philosophically and 
politically. This shared philosophical perspective 1S not accidental, smce 
technocentrism's commodification of natural resources and ecocentrism's 
romanticisation of nature emerged as two aspects of the same historical process. As 
O'Connor explains: 
Rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, and the commodification of land and labour 
resulted in both a human separation from nature and in a seemingly paradoxically 
greater or more universal respect in preserving nature, that is, the romantic 
sentimentalisation of nature presupposed the real or material alienation from the 
natural world (O'Connor, 1997: 24). 
As uncritical expressions of an alienated worldview, technocentrism and ecocentrism are 
unable to step outside of their specific cultural determination and appreciate the 
historicity of their perspectives. The nature that each presents is depicted as 'natural', or 
'authentic', outside of human subj ~ctive construction. 
My purpose in this thesis, as I outlined in the Introduction, is to explore a more self-
critical environmental ethic than that offered by mainstream environmentalism. 
According to Callicot and Ames (1989), the discipline of environmental philosophy was 
founded precisely in order to challenge the basic assumptions underlying our traditional 
perceptions of nature: 
The real-world problems which taken together constitute the so-called 
'environmental crisis' appear to be of such ubiquity, magnitude, recalcitrance, and 
synergistic complexity, that they force on philosophy the task not of applying 
familiar ethical theories, long in place, but of rethinking the underlying moral and 
metaphysical assumptions that seem to have had a significant role in bringing on 











traditional metaphysics and moral theory are more at the root of environmental 
problems than tools for their solution (Callicot and Ames, 1989: 1). 
This chapter outlines an environmental philosophical perspective that can transcend the 
"limitations of technocentrism and ecocentrism. I begin by distinguishing different social 
attitudes to nature within capitalist society and then explore the ways in which the 
contemporary struggle for environmental justice by oppressed and exploited people in 
different parts of the world constitutes a conscious or unconscious redefinition of 
environmentalism. 
5.2 EXPERIENCE AND IDENTITY: THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE AND 
COMMONALITY 
In the first part of this thesis I argued that notwithstanding the objective reality of nature 
and our ability to approximate its truth, our conceptions of nature are loaded with a 
human subjectivity that is historically and socially determined. Humans construct and 
communicate their relations with nature in a way that draws on and reflects their social 
identity, so that their interpretations of nature, and their attitudes and behaviour towards 
their natural environment, are rooted in their life experiences (Dickens, 1996: 85). 
How a subsistence farmer, an urban industrial worker, the owner of a commercial farm, 
and a middle class nature-lover, variously regard nature and relate to it~ reflect very 
different experiences of their respective environments (Soper, 1995: 218). These 
responses have as much to do with the social relations through which their experience of 











contemporary world there is probably no experience of nature (be it through the 
utilisation of natural resources, recreation, or aesthetic appreciation) that does not 
confront questions of ownership, control, and access - questions which fundamentally 
determine the nature of that engagement .. 
To illustrate how capitalist social relations give rise to very different attitudes towards 
nature we can consider the question of contemporary aesthetic appreciations of the 
natural environment. Just as our aCCeSS to natural resources is determined by political, 
economic, and social relations, the way in which cultural and aesthetic conceptions of 
nature get articulated is affected by power relations in society. The dominant social ideas 
about nature are shaped by a privileged minority and are not necessarily shared by 
everyone. Soper argues that 
we need to insert a class dimension into any account of ourselves as nature lovers, 
since relations of class are not only inscribed physically within the landscape 
itself, but have also had a major impact on the production and consumption of its 
cultural representation (Soper, 1995: 234). 
The dominant discourses within· environmentalism (and here I refer to a broad green 
sentiment that embraces both shallow and deep ecologists as well as informed middle 
classi public opinion) assume that there is a common universal valuing, or capacity to 
value nature, amongst humans. Such assumptions are not self-critical regarding the 
cultural and historical conditioning of their essentially middle class appreciation of 
nature's aesthetic appeal and its intrinsic value (Soper, 1995: 216t This appreciation of 
nature's sublime aspects, argues Soper, is a product of our domination over nature - it is 











by virtue of the confidence and safety of middle class control and mastery of our natural 
environment. 
People who are closer to nature in their productive and reproductive work, those who are 
entirely estranged from it in their life experience, and those who do not have the same 
confidence and experience of ownership and control are unlikely to appreciate nature in 
the same way (Soper, 1995: 230)iii. These latter socio-economic groups, including 
peasants, agricultural and industrial workers, the lower middle class, and a range of 
marginalised peoples, constitute the majority of humankind - a majority whose 
experiences of, and attitudes towards, nature are generally not articulated through the 
dominant discourses of contemporary environmentalism. 
Once we open the door to the question of the diversity of social and cultural experiences 
of nature and attitudes towards the natural environment amongst the impoverished and 
oppressed majority of humankind we are faced with an important tension. What is the 
relation between that diversity and the equally important reality of an increasingly 
common globalised experience of social, economic, and environmental injustice?iV Is 
there a way of bringing together the different local perspectives amongst workers, 
peasants, and marginalised people internationally into a grander narrative of common 
struggle around global environmental issues? 
The post-structuralist emphasis on local identity is extremely valuable in its evocation 











of people's expression of that experience. A range of post-structuralist, Marxist, and 
feminist theorists have sought to conceptualise this "situated knowledge" (Haraway in 
Harvey, 1992) in a number of ways. Guha and Martinez-Alier identify a flexible and 
diverse '''vocabulary of protest" through which poor communities articulate their struggle 
for access to resources at the same time as challenging the oppressive and exploitative 
regimes that dominate their lives (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 13). Harvey highlights 
the "militant particularism" of community struggle that emanates from people's 
identification with their local lived experience (Harvey, 1996: 32). Cheney, in his 
postulation of the "bioregional narrative," emphasises the importance of a community's 
physical space in constructing "storied residence" and "historically positioned voices". 
Physical space, he argues, is also a cultural and moral space and provides the basis for a 
single lived reality of mindscape and landscape (Cheney, 1990: 4-9). 
Peet and Watts offer the "environmental imaginary" as a way of conceptualising how 
people think and reason creatively on the basis of their material and cultural experiences 
of nature, environment, and place (peet and Watts, 1996: 263). This "environmental 
imaginary" captures well the rich dialectical interaction between humans and their natural 
environment, and between human thought, practice, and reflection. 
Natural environments, visible still beneath layers of socialisation, landscapes 
which express human use of what remains primarily natural space, the places 
groups of people inhabit, are main sources in the creation of their meaning 
systems, aesthetics, and systems of thought. In particular the 'pictures' or images 
which form the first moments in the creation of thoughts, and which thought 
constantly employs as materialisations, are representations of specific natural and 
social environments ... While environmental imaginaries stem from material and 
social practices in natural settings they also guide further practices ... there is an 











constantly rebuilt and refigured, accumulate· and change, during practical 
activities which imagination has previously framed (Peet and Watts, 1996: 267). 
,Much of this theorisation of situated knowledge (including the work of a number of those 
cited above) explores the dynamics of engagement between local identity and broader 
social, geographical, and political identities. But there are also arguments within post-
modernist deconstructionism that emphasise the absoluteness of difference and are 
opposed to any form of universal narrative. As Cheney argues: 
T otalising, colonising discourse arises from concepts and theories being 
abstracted from their paradigm settings and applied elsewhere ... the danger is that 
the theory when applied to a situation specified by the theory will serve not to 
articulate that new situation ... but will serve as a mechanism of de facto repression 
of at least some of the experiential dimensions of the situation and lead to 
confusion and baffiement at the level of action and conscious attempts to 
understand one's own situation and what one is about (Cheney, 1989: 120). 
This emphasis on difference can lead to a rejection of any possibility of socially shared 
values and collective purpose. At its most extreme this leaves us with "communities of 
one" (Frodeman, 1992: 315-8) and therefore with the paralysing politics of indifference 
(Quigley, 1992: 297). 
Against that prospect, Cheney (drawing on post-structural feminism), argues for a 
"privileged discourse of the oppressed" - privileged because of its potential ability to 
challenge dominant discourses (Cheney, 1989: 117-8). Frodeman agrees with this in his 
assertion that post-modernism's "metaphysical insight is matched by a blindness to the 
political consequences" (Frodeman, 1992: 315). He argues that while post-modernism 
can justifiably claim that every conceptual scheme or discourse can be seen as an 











make a political difference and are important to mobilise around (Frodeman, 1992: 314-
5). Haraway puts forward a similar challenge, arguing that it is not difference that 
matters, but significant difference. 
We risk lapsing into boundless difference and giving up on the confusing task of 
making partial, real connection. Some differences are playful, some are poles of 
world historical systems of domination. Epistemology is about knowing the 
difference (quoted in Harvey, 1992: 304). 
While it is likely that within the broad left there would be agreement that it is the voices 
of the oppressed that must be given privilege, this does not resolve the question of which 
differences or identities are significant. Central to the post-modernist rejection of grand 
narratives and totalising discourses is its rejection of Marxism and the meaningfulness of 
class as an identityv. 
The post-modernist left has found it easier to erect and shoot down its own straw dog of a 
reductionist, deterministic, and oppressive concept 'of class, than to explore the class 
dimensions of the identities that it does accept - such as gender, ethnicity, race, religion, 
and sexuality. It certainly has not engaged with the creative and dynamic analytical use of 
the concept of class suggested by classical dialectical materialism. There is nothing 
. inherently simplistic or restrictive about the concept of class and the allegation that it 
cannot accommodate the rich diversity of people's complex and varied identities suggests 
a too narrow economic use of the term. However people see themselves and whatever 
fragmentation contemporary capitalism has created, this does not deny the 
epistemological and political validity of class relations and class struggle. The value of 











embrace the dynamic tension between different levels of experience and identity -
between all that is unique and particular and that which is shared and common. 
Too great an emphasis on difference and marginality allows for little if any engagement 
with wider discourses· as the means for shaping commonality and opposition (i.e. 
significant difference) in political struggle. Harvey argues that 
while postmodernism opens up a radical prospect by acknowledging the 
authenticity of other voices, postmodern thinking immediately shuts off those 
other voices from access to more universal sources of power by ghettoizing them 
within an opaque otherness ... It thereby disempowers those voices (of women, 
ethnic and racial minorities, colonised peoples, the unemployed, youth etc.) in a 
world oflopsided power relations (Harvey, 1992: 302). 
Alongside the importance and value oflocal identity in the experience of humanity, is the 
fact of a commonality of exploitation and oppression and therefore the possibility of 
forging significant collective identities. Although globalised capitalism encourages 
differentiation and competition along spatial, gender, ethnic, national, and religious lines 
by diminishing people's access to resources and through market relations, it also 
increasingly universalises the experiences and conditions facing humanity. For this 
reason it is important to explore the potential for "bringing together all the various highly 
differentiated and often local movements into some kind of commonality of purpose" 
(Harvey, 1998: 63). 
If globalised capitalism is the cause of so much common human experience of suffering, 
then recognition of that commonality involves stepping out of an immediate situation and 











involves an exposure to new knowledge, new concepts, new experiences, conflicting 
loyalties, and new levels of detachment from an immediate and familiar lived experience. 
Such a process is not just about adding identities and spaces together, but involves the 
expansion of identity and spatiality and the development of new conceptions of people's 
place in the worldvi . But it is through an interaction of immediate local anger and struggle 
(a militant particularism) with a more detached apprehension of that same condition from 
a regional, national, or international perspective that provides the experience through 
which people define their commonality and difference (Harvey, 1996: 37). There is 
. nothing predetermined or inevitable about the outcome of that kind of process, but its 
potential exists in the very activity and recognition of purposeful human struggle. 
The post-modernist emphasis on local identity and situated knowledge has certainly 
enriched our conceptualisation of the complexity of social relations, experience, and 
identity. However, any celebration of difference and locality that does not seek to explore 
the reality of commonality acts as a constraint on the necessity and potential to develop a 
political perspective on global environmental problems. As Gare argues, 
the notion of a 'global environmental crisis' can be deconstructed and shown to 
serve the power interests of those who are attempting to mobilise people to 
address it. And, with their opposition to extra-texts beyond the text and to texts 
that would sum up other texts, to grand narratives which would put local 
narratives in perspective, (postmodernists) leave environmentalists no way to 
defend their belief that there is a global crisis or to work out what kind of 
response is required to meet it ... They are bound by assumptions which make the 
idea of a global environmental crisis incomprehensible (Gare, 1995: 99). 
During the last two decades there has emerged a new form of grassroots struggle and 











justice concerns facing impoverished and oppressed people in various parts of the world. 
What characterises this movement is both its particularism and its commonality. While 
many of these' struggles emerge spontaneously around specific local issues, the thrust of 
their purpose and message resonates with a universal striving for social and 
environmental justice. Without denying the diversity of these articulations of struggle, I 
now tum to explore the common features of this grassroots movement as the foundation 
for a potential grand narrative of radical environmentalism (Gare, 1995). 
5.3 THE REDEFINmON OF ENVIRONMENTALISM BY CONTEMPORARY 
STRUGGLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
The ways in which exploited and oppressed people in different parts of the world have 
expressed their struggles around environmental issues have been conceptualised as an 
"environmentalism of the poor" and as the movement for "environmental justice" (Guha 
and Martinez-Alier, 1997; Sethi, 1993; Brown and Masterson, 1994; Di Chiro, 1995). I 
will discuss the features of these and suggest that they can both be usefully embraced 
within the perspective of a struggle for environmental justice, a perspective which offers 
significant and progressive challenges to the dominant discourses in environmentalism. 
In their book Varieties of Environmentalism, Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) distinguish 
between two kinds of environmentalism on a global scale - a First World 
environmentalism and an environmentalism of the poor defined geo-politically in terms 
of a North/South divide (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 16-21). They characterise the 











affluent regions of the world. This First World (essentially middle class) green 
consciousness often claims that people in poor Third World countries lack environmental 
awareness due to their 'preoccupation with meeting basic needs, a struggle which is 
assumed to be generally hostile to environmental protection (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 
1997: xiv). 
Yet the basic livelihood struggles of impoverished people do not simply negate 
environmental concern, but rather approach environmental issues from a different 
perspective from that of conservationism. The environmentalism of the poor does not 
start from a detached concern for species and habitat protection for its own sake, but 
originates in people's defence against environmental change or destruction that 
negatively affects their way of life and their prospects for survival. This is primarily a 
struggle over access to, and control over, natural resources such as land, forests, and 
water - a struggle which often coincides with the need to defend an ecosystem against the 
negative impact of industrial or agricultural development (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 
1997: xx-xxi). 
A notable example of this coincidence of livelihood struggle and environmental 
protection was the resistance of peasants in the southern Indian state of Kamataka in the 
1980's to the conversion of 30 000 acres of their subsistence farming lands into a 
eucalyptus plantation for a rayon multinational company. At the same time as threatening 











to soil fertility, water resources, and natural biodiversity (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 
8-11). 
The vocabulary of protest which emerges in environmental-livelihood struggles such as 
this, immediately binds together issues of nature and ecology with issues of social, 
economic, and political rights and justice (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997: 13-18; Sethi, 
1993: 128). This integration of environmental, economic, social, and political issues, 
emerging. out of experience rather than ideology, stands in marked contrast to the 
human/nature dualism out of which First World conservationism stems. 
It is not altogether useful to see these contrasting perspectives on environmental issues 
simply in terms of a North/South divide. Within all nations, as well as internationally, 
differential access to economic resources, political rights, and social justice constitute 
conflictual social relations through which different classes mediate their experiences of 
their environment. It is more useful then to make use of O'Connor's conceptualisation of 
a middle class "ecologism of affluence" and the "ecology of survival" of the exploited 
and oppressed as an international phenomenon that takes different fonns in different 
countries (O'Connor, 1997: 255). 
As evidence of this is the emergence of environmental justice struggles, particularly in 
North America, as a radical challenge to conventional understandings of what constitutes 
the environment. These largely localised struggles do not start with a concern for un spoilt 











The central thrust of environmental justice struggles in the United States has been the 
national Toxic Waste Movement, consisting of some 7 000 local groups in the early 
1990's (Brown and Masterson, 1994: 270). Their campaigns led to the closure and clean-
up of many hazardous waste sites close to residential areas, forced government and 
private companies to upgrade pollution management, and generated a more conscious and 
confident involvement of working class communities in shaping their urban environment 
(Brown and Masterson, 1994: 278). 
In the 1980's a Los Angeles African-American community mobilised successfully to 
resist the construction of a solid-waste incinerator in their neighbourhood. This 
experience led to a range of other organised actions around housing, schools, drugs, and 
security - problems which the community argued were environmental issues (Di Chiro, 
1995: 298). For this community, as for a whole network of localised groupings and 
actions that emerged during the 1980's, the environment starts with the places, 
relationships, and activities that define and sustain a community's way of life (Di Chiro, 
1995: 300). 
The elements that make up the vocabulary of protest of environmental struggle within 
urban working class communities are diverse. There are cultural factors such as the Latin 
American minority's conception of nature as a garden in which humans are active agents 
as opposed to. the Anglo Saxon idea of nature as a dehumanised wilderness (proctor, 
1995: 287). The fact that many of the environmental justice activists are women (mothers 











immediately humanises and domesticates urban environmental issues (Brown and 
Masterson, 1994: 274). The intimate connection between work, recreation, and domestic 
. activity in urban working class communities encourages an integrated conception of the 
environment. Environmental issues are often strongly politicised, for example through the 
"environmental racism" that sees waste mainly being dumped on the doorsteps of black 
working class communities (Di Chiro, 1995: 303). 
Many environmental non-governmental organisations have been slow to give support to 
environmental justice struggles because the environment for them is conceptualised as 
that nature that lies outside of areas of dense human settlement and activity. Waste issues 
are regarded by these green organisations as community health matters rather than strictly 
environmental concerns (Di Chiro, 1995: 298-299). Mistrust by working class 
communities of middle class environmentalism has been exacerbated by experiences of 
resettlement and job losses that working class communities have faced as a result of some 
conservation and urban clean-up initiatives (Di Chiro, 1995: 305). 
In spite of the fact that the environmental struggles of land-based peasants and workers in 
underdeveloped countries of the South are mainly concerned with access to economic 
resources, and those of urban working class communities are more often around health 
and living conditions, the concept of environmental justice, insofar as it captures an 
integration of social, economic, political, and environmental issues, can well embrace 
both of these grassroots perspectives. Struggles for environmental justice, as de-centred, 











progressive redefinition of environmentalism. This potential, I would argue, lies in the 
following broad philosophical and political characteristics of the environmental justice 
perspective .. 
Firstly, the perspective of environmental justice philosophically challenges the 
human/nature dualism of technocentric and ecocentric environmentalism. It does not take 
as its starting point a nature that is separate from human society, but begins with a 
humanised environment as its main concern. A perspective on the environment that starts 
. with the place where people live and work, immediately integrates human affairs into our 
relation with nature. This is true of struggles around access to natural resources as well as 
struggles for a healthy living and working environment. Implicit in this integrated 
perspective is a recognition of humans as being both part-of-nature (insofar as 
environmental justice struggles express a dependence on our natural environment), and as 
apart-from-nature (insofar as these struggles are concerned to consciously re-shape how 
we relate socially to our natural environment). 
Secondly, struggles for environmental justice advocate that environmental issues and 
problems are inseparable from political questions of poverty and social justice. A struggle 
for access to resources or against the location of a toxic waste dump is simultaneously a 
challenge to class, cultural, or racial discrimination. It immediately forces us to recognise 
that we make choices about our relation to our environment and that in a society based on 
class division those choices, and our very conceptualisation and appreciation of nature, 











should be, uncontaminated by politics. Philosophically, it challenges the notion that we 
can approach nature simply as an objective natural reality that is unaffected by cultural 
construction. The voice of environmental justice forces us to be philosophically self-
critical about our conceptions of nature and exposes the class and political interests that 
we project onto our relations with our natural environment. 
Thirdly, by putting their needs and interests in the forefront of their· struggles around 
environmental issues, impoverished communities deconstruct any claim that we can 
speak on behalf of nature. The environmental justice asserts that human needs and values 
lie at the heart of our relation to our environment. This is not necessarily anthropocentric 
arrogance - it is a humanism that arises inevitably out of being human, and it has as much 
potential to develop a relation to nature that is ecologically sound as it does to abuse 
nature. 
In the following chapter I examine the environmental justice struggles of the black 
majority in South Africa in order to highlight the potential of this emerging movement to 
challenge the traditional concerns of conservationism and the human/nature dualism that 











Notes to Chapter 5 
i By using the category of 'middle class' I am referring loosely to a broad category of 
people that includes property owners, business people, salaried professional people, and 
intellectuals. 
ii It is paradoxical that while middle class environmentalism assumes that everyone must 
appreciate nature aesthetically, one of its biggest fears is the "democratisation of the 
nature aesthetic." Middle class appreciation of nature regards itself as "genuine" - as 
opposed to the more vulgar mass enjoyment of commercialised nature (Soper, 1995: 239-
243). This class prejudice regarding how nature should be viewed and appreciated' 
inevitably blames the. "less sensitive" part of humanity for degradation of the 
environment. What should not be forgotten however, is that it is for the most part the 
property. owning class - with all its appreciation of and access to unspoilt nature - that 
defends the economic and social system which is responsible for most of our 
environmental abuse. 
111 This is not to argue that these social layer:s do not have emotional and spiritual 
connection with nature. Rather, what is generally outside their experience, is the 
particular detached aesthetic sentiment that is part of middle class culture. 
iv The concept of 'environmental injustice' is used to identify a pattern of discrimination 
in the way that environmental problems impact more often on working class, poor, and 
marginalised people than they do on affiuent communities. A common example of this is 
the location of waste sites close to working class communities. (Brown and Masterson, 
1994) 
v See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the post-structuralist critique of Marxist essentialism. 
vi Jameson (1984) conceptualises this process as "cognitive mapping". He argues that in 
order for people to deal with the insecurities and disorientation of globalisation we need 
"a pedagogical political culture which seeks to endow the individual subject with some 
new heightened sense of its place in the global system ... (through which} ... we may again 
begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity 
to act and struggle which is at present neutralised by our spatial as well as our social 












A CASE STUDY: THE EMERGENCE OF AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa's human and natural landscape has been· scarred by a long history of 
violence, abuse, and exploitation. The sharp political, social, and economic divisions 
along lines of class, race, and gender have nurtured extremely different and conflictual 
life experiencesi . Mediated through these inequalities, people's experiences of nature and 
their attitudes towards the environment are thus vastly different. In this chapter I begin by 
outlining the very different experiences that different classes, largely racially defined, 
have historically had of the natural environment. in South Africa. These different 
experiences have given rise to contrasting and conflicting environmental perspectives and 
politics. In the second half of the chapter I explore the emergence of the environmental 
justice movement in South Africa and the challenge that it poses to mainstream 
environmentalism. 
6.2 CLASS, RACE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
At the heart of the different class and cultural experiences of the natural environment in 
South Africa lies the historical struggle for control and access to resources (Mittelman, 
1998: 854). Through the process of colonial conquest, capitalist development, and 
apartheid oppression, the affluent, and largely white ruling class developed a confident 
control over natural resources and, accompanying this, a tradition of nature conservation 











people, their relation to their environment has been dominated by dispossession and a 
basic livelihood struggle for access to resources a struggle which, for the most part, has 
come into conflict with conservationist concerns. 
A central feature of colonial conquest, the establishment of white settler domination, and 
the early development of capitalism was a struggle over land (Khan, 1990a: 14). Land 
dispossession, the introduction of private land ownership, the development of commercial 
agriculture, the forcing of people into reserves through the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, and 
the development of the migrant labour system dramatically transformed the indigenous 
peoples' social relations and their relation to the natural environment (Khan, 1990a: 16). 
Apartheid legislation served to compound the alienation introduced by land dispossession 
and the coercion of people into wage labour. The pass system, the Group Areas Act, and 
the Separate Amenities Act restricted the movement of blacks and their ability to identify 
with their environment. As Sachs eloquently states, "Ours is one of the most divided 
countries in the world, criss-crossed with legal, physical and psychological dongas. Who 
today can say that this, the veld, the mountains, the rivers, the seashore, the sky, and the 
sunsets, all this is my country" (Sachs, 1990: 2). Within the urban environment the black 
majority of the population have historically been forced to live in townships on the edge 
of cities and industrial areas where living conditions are physically and spiritually 
oppressive (Khan, 1990: 16). This lived experience of poverty, inequality, powerlessness, 
and material and spiritual dispossession has produced and reproduced an extreme 











The history of apartheid-capitalism in South Africa has not only served to alienate people 
from nature but has also nurtured a strong hostility amongst the oppressed majority 
towards mainstream environmentalism. Blacks have historically resisted the 
implementation of many conservation programmes, tied as these often were to attacks on 
their livelihood. Homeland betterment schemes, fencing, culling, forced removal, 
restrictions on hunting and gathering, and the proclamation of reserves threatened to 
disrupt and transform people's relation to their environment (Khan, 1989: 4). 
The government's betterment schemes of the early 1940's, which sought to transform 
traditional settlement patterns and farming practices in an effort to combat soil erosion in 
the reserves, were met with organised resistance (Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 99). This 
conservation effort ignored the fact that overgrazing and overcultivation were the result 
of the forced concentration of people on 13% of the land (Khan, 1990a: 17). 
A central issue in the Pondoland rebellion of 1960 was the apartheid government's 
attempt to protect coastal forests for aesthetic and ecological reasons. These were areas 
where people had long gathered wood and medicinal plants and hunted small animals 
(Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 102). This was just one of many experiences of people being 
pushed off their land and excluded from an environment they had long interacted with, in 
the interests of wildlife conservation. While their hunting practices were redefined as 
poaching, rural black people were left to watch white farmers freely pursuing wild 











Resistance to these conservation efforts has fed the white ruling class notion that blacks 
are responsible for environmental degradation and for thwarting the conservation cause 
and that they lack any environmental awareness (Khan, 1989: 3-4). However, black 
communities have experienced conservationism as a feature of the power and privilege of 
a racist white ruling class and as integral to the development and application of 
segregation and apartheid policies (Khan, 1989: 4). Environmentalism, as it has been 
defined by middle class white interests in South Africa, has either been regarded with 
indifference by the majority of the black population or it is seen to be an explicit tool of 
oppression (Khan, 1989: 3; McDonald, 1998: 2). Knill argues that this says less about 
popular environmental awareness than it does about the narrow way in which middle 
class interests have defined the environment. 
Environmentalism per-se has been largely invented by middle class capital to 
defend conservationist aims and at the same time deliberately excludes the 
worker, poor, and indigenous population component from the argument (Knill in 
EJNF, 1995: 21). 
It is important then to explore the fact that the daily struggles of the impoverished 
working class and marginalised communities have been 'environmental' in a broader 
sense than that suggested by the traditional conservationist perspective. In the next 
section of this chapter I argue that the grassroots struggle for environmental justice offers 











6.3 THE STRUGGLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AS A CHALLENGE 
TO ENVIRONMENTALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Within the last decade there have emerged three connected developments that have 
challenged the traditional conservationism of environmental politics in South Africa. The 
first reflects the international shift within mainstream environmentalism away from 
resource conservation and towards environmental management. This shift arises partly 
out of the recognition of ecological complexity and the importance of managing habitats 
and ecosystems rather than focusing on species protection. This has prompted greater 
effort towards managing ecological systems beyond formal reserve areas so that 
environmental protection more and more has to integrate (rather than exclude) the 
dynamic of human settlement and developmentii. An example of this can be seen in the 
growing co-operation between farmers and environmentalists in ensuring a balance 
between the utilisation and protection of a habitat or ecosystem (Beinhart and Coates, 
1995: 82-6). 
The shift towards a more flexible environmental management follows precedents set in 
Britain and the United States of including human settlements in protected areas and 
involving local people in environmental management projects. Probably the best example 
of this in South Africa to date is the involvement of local farmers in the Richtersveld 
national park (Beinhart and Coates, 1995: 88-90iii . Reflecting this shifts away from 
narrow conservationism, Khan argues that 
the South African environmental movement ... has shown a significant move 
away from the narrowly-based, wildlife centred, punitive approach of the past, 











undeniably a more people-centred, democratic and socially just approach to 
environmental issues, is taking root in South Africa (Khan, 1992: 95-6). 
The second challenge to traditional conservationism is political. Over the last decade, and 
particularly since the transition to democracy in South Africa, there has been an 
increasing politicisation of environmental issues. Political parties, trade unions, 
community organisations, and non-governmental organisations, many of which have long 
ignored environmental. issues, have increasingly integrated these into their concerns and 
activities (McDonald, 1998: 2). This is reflected in the new level of recognition that has· 
been given to environmental rights in the new constitution, and to the development of 
progressive environmental legislation and policy over the last five years. This growing 
political recognition of environmental issues has at the same time reflected a shift from 
the exclusionary conservationist discourse to "one in which the definition of the 
environment has expanded to include the working and living conditions of black South 
Africans" (McDonald, 1998: 1). 
There are varIOUS international and national factors that have brought about this 
humanisation and politicisation of environmental issues within the organised 
environmental movement and within the formal political life of South Africa: Probably 
the single most important factor has been the groundswell of grassroots struggle against 
social and environmental injustice in South Africa over the last decade. 
Working cl~ss blacks in both urban and rural areas have long been forced to live and 











resources. Women, as primary caretakers most responsible for reproductive work, have 
had to bear the brunt of this environmental injustice (Moore and RoHet, 1998). The 
. environmental problems facing workers and poor communities include unhealthy and 
unsafe working conditions, unemployment, low wages, lack of shelter, overcrowding, 
little access to clean water or adequate sanitation, exposure to industrial pollution and 
hazardous materials such as asbestos, inadequate municipal and social services, polluting 
fuel, soil erosion, and poor urban environments. A strong feature of environmental 
injustice in South Africa is the location of hazardous waste sites close to black working 
class residential areas such as at Arlington, Ibhayi, and Aloes in the Eastern Cape (Moore 
and Rollet, 1998). 
In the late 1980's and early 1990's poor communities increasingly began to organise and 
speak out against the environmental problems affecting them. In 1989 Mafefe villagers in 
the Northern Province protested against their exposure to dust from blue asbestos dumps; 
in 1990 inhabitants of the township of Zamdela, downwind from Sasol's.oil-from-coal 
plant, demonstrated against the soot, carbon dioxide, and nitric gases that polluted their 
township; and in that same year residents of Azaadville near Krugersdorp resisted the 
location of a hazardous waste site next to where they lived (Koch, 1991: 21). 
Because workers are in the frontline of environmental abuse facing particular hazards in 
their work situations, unions have played an important role in articulating struggles for 
health and safety. In the early 1990's these workplace struggles were increasingly linked 











a nearby community in 1989 by the Thor company at its mercury-processing plant in 
Kwazulu-Natal, led to the formation of a "rainbow alliance" of trade unions, community 
organisations, and environmental groups (Cock, 1991: 10). Similarly the Food and Allied 
Workers Union and the Dolphin Action and Protection Group embarked on joint action in 
1990 against the conditions facing workers on Taiwanese trawlers (Koch, 1991: 21). 
Earthlife Africa, as a middle class environmental group which later led the formation of 
the Environmental Justice Networking Forum, became particularly active in alliance with 
trade unions such as the Chemical Workers Industrial Union and the South African 
Chemical Workers Union in fighting toxic waste issues (Khan, 1991: 52). 
These grassroots struggles against dangerous, unhealthy, and alienating working and 
living conditions, and the organisational development that grew out of them, led to the 
establishment in the early 1990's of the Environmental Justice Networking Forum 
(EJNF) as a national alliance of over 500 non-governmental, labour, and community-
based organisations. It declared that its purpose is to seek to ''transform environmental 
governance in South Africa so that it becomes participatory, people-centred, socially-just 
and ecologically-sustainable" by supporting the efforts of its member organisations ''to 
strengthen and support action taken by poor communities and workers to address the 
environmental injustices threatening their health and well-being" (EJNF, 1997: 32). 
The activities of the EJNF have included organising and supporting community actions 
around environmental justice issues, particularly on the issue of waste in communities 











critiquing developing legislation and government policy and playing an active lobbying 
role in parliament; spearheading large campaigns such as that against Thor Chemicals 
. and against the expansion of the oil refinery in Durban South~ connecting up with 
international environmental campaigns such as that against the global toxic waste trade; 
the development and implementation of environmental education at a grassroots level; 
and research and advocacy work around resource issues (such as water, forestry, and 
mining), desertification, militarisation, and privatisation (EJNF, ] 996-9). In early 1998 
the EJNF facilitated the People, Poverty and Environment hearings which exposed the 
severe environmental injustices facing workers and poor communities across South 
Africa (EJNF, 1998). 
Central to these emergmg environmental justice struggles and to their organised 
expression is the recognition that environmental issues in South Africa are deeply 
political in that they are defined by access to power and resources. By integrating the 
struggle against poverty and social injustice with the struggle against environmental 
abuse, the environmental justice movement offers a humanised approach to nature that 
challenges the alienated dualism of mainstream environmentalism. Out of this 
philosophical holism the environmental justice perspective takes as its political starting 
point the need to transform human social, economic, and political relations as the basis 
upon which to construct a more ecologically sound relation to nature. As the EJNF 
argues, 
Environmental justice is about social transformation directed towards meeting 
basic human needs and enhancing our quality of life economic quality, health 
care, housing, human rights, environmental protection, and democracy. In linking 











to challenge the abuse of power which results in poor people having to suffer the 
effects of environmental damage caused by the greed of others ... In recognising 
that environmental damage has the greatest impact upon poor people, EJNF seeks 
the ensure the right of those most affected to participate at all levels of 
environmental decision-making (EJNF, 1996-9). 
The struggle for environmental justice in South Africa, as in many other countries, offers 
the potential to redefine what we understand by the environment and to broaden and 
humanise what is embraced within environmental politics. It opens up the prospect of 
relating to the environment not just as unspoilt nature in managed wilderness areas, but as 
the conditions in which people live and work (EJNF, 1995: 9). The environmental ethic 
in South Africa needs to be broadened out from the narrow conservationist interests that 
it has historically represented, so that it can embrace "the greening of the lives of the 
millions who cut the grass and water the trees of others while they live in the sand 
themselves" (Sachs, 1990: 3). 
Having explored concretely the emergence of environmental justice struggles 
internationally and in South Africa and having highlighted the significance of their 
challenge to mainstream environmentalism, I now turn to reflect theoretically on the 











Notes to Chapter 6 
i While it is important to explore different gender experiences (especially within the 
urban and rural working class) of the environment in South Africa and the different 
perspectives that these give rise to, this will not be done in any systematic way in this 
chapter. 
ii This approach is well illustrated by the United Nations concept of the 'biosphere' which 
has been applied in the Kogelberg coastal area of the South Western Cape. A biosphere 
outlines a wide area of ecological importance within which different degrees of 
development, settlement, and conservation are accommodated. 
iii The blossoming of eco-tourism is part of this development towards a more humanised 
and . accessible approach to conservation, although I would argue that this 
commodification of indigenous culture and its environmental interaction offers new 












THE PROGRESSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the progressive developments within the environmental movement in South 
Africa there is a very low level of active popular awareness of the need to change our 
attitude and behaviour towards our natural environment. Research has shown that this is 
true in many parts of the world (Khan, 1990b: 36). The lack of a broad environmental 
awareness is particularly evident in working class and poor communities whose 
interaction with nature is often uninformed and abusive. How then can the impoverished 
. and oppressed majority of humanity, with its sporadic and spontaneous struggle for 
environmental justice, be regarded as a progressive force in the struggle to transform our 
human relations with nature? 
To approach this question requires an elaboration of the dialectical themes offered by 
Marx's perspective on human-nature relations and developed through my critique of the 
dominant philosophical and political perspectives of mainstream environmentalism. I do 
this in the first section of this final chapter. What I put forward as propositions for an 
environmental justice ethic provides the basis on which to identify more specifically the 
potential of the environmental justice perspective as a force for change and the challenges 











7.2 PROPOSITIONS FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ETHIC 
. Out of my exploration of what Marxism has to offer to environmental philosophy 
regarding the relation between humans and nature and through my critique of the 
alienated dualism expressed by both technocentric and ecocentric environmentalism, I 
suggest the following theoretical propositions through which to develop a radical socio-
environmental perspective: i 
• Humans are both part-of-nature and apart-from-nature. This is an essential unalterable 
fact of existence. It constitutes the contradictory unity that lies at the heart of the 
human physical and spiritual condition. The dynamic tension between human 
dependence on nature and relative autonomy from nature is a thread that runs through 
all of human and environmental history. It is a thread of mutual determination, 
whereby human history is enabled and constrained by ecological processes and in 
tum impacts on nature. For example, humans rely on ecological processes in order to 
consume plant food matter essential to our existence. We have intervened in these 
processes through diverse methods of cultivation in order to affect the quantity and 
quality of what nature offers. In doing so our interventions impact on the terrestrial, 
atmospheric, and hydrological processes which make agriculture possible. 
• Humans, in contrast to other species, have a relative autonomy from the ecological 
systems on which they depend. This relative autonomy is the human capacity to stand 
separately from nature and transform it to meet socially defined needs. It is the 
expression of this capacity that has given various historical forms to the essential 
relation between humans and nature i.e. to the different ways in which human 
society has organised itself in relation to nature in order to reproduce itself It is 
through our exercise of this capacity that we have alienated ourselves from nature and 
created life-threatening problems in our natural environment, and it is through this 











• The framework that nature offers in our engagement with our environment both in 
terms of possibilities and constraints - constitutes nature as an objective reality 
outside of our perception and engagement with it. Through that engagement however, 
we develop cultural and social constructs of nature that are imbued with human 
values. We depict nature variously as machine, organism, commodity, savage, noble, 
as a moral authority, a source of spiritual inspiration, or as a collection of useful 
resources. The challenge facing humanity, in its effort to end its abuse of its natural 
environment, is to shape the nature that we want on the basis of ecological wisdom. 
Such ecological wisdom must be self-critical in recognising that the nature we engage 
with is not simply an objective reality that reveals its truth to scientific enquiry, but 
that that truth all the time embraces our ideas of what we want nature to be. This 
construction of nature is not necessarily a problem. It is inevitable as an expression of 
our relative autonomy from nature - it is how we express our humanity. The 
challenge that we face is to construct a humanist ethics that are in accord with the 
ecological processes offered by nature. 
• Ecology cannot organically prescribe to human society specific forms of social 
organisation as deep ecology would have it .. Our relative autonomy from nature 
requires far more conscious construction of our social relationsii. But ecological 
premises and principles do have metaphysical implications for human society. By 
virtue of the fact that nature embraces and implies human existence, nature's 
processes have implications for how we understand ourselves individually and 
collectively (Callieo!, 1989: 51). This is the basis on which to develop ecological 
wisdom - in terms of seeking to relate to nature in a way that harmonises with natural 
ecological processes (Wei-Ming, 1989: 72).iii This constitutes the foundation on 
which to construct what Marx identified as our need to engage intimately with nature 
physically and spiritually as an expression of our human nature and potential 
(parsons, 1977: 39), and what Chinese philosophy argues is the conscious connection 












• Since our relation to nature emerges out of, and is shaped by, our social organisation 
(economic, political, and social relations), we can only change how we relate to our 
environment materially and spiritually by changing how we organise ourselves 
socially. To develop an ecologically-sound relation to nature then, requires political, 
social, and economic transformation. I have argued that a progressive 
environmentalism that seeks to go beyond technocentric end-of-pipe solutions cannot 
take the status quo of contemporary capitalism as given. The struggle against our 
contemporary environmental crisis must at the same time be an explicitly political, 
economic, and social struggle for transformation of human society. 
• I have argued that to see this transformation as taking place through an "organic 
maturation of consciousness", as deep ecology envisages, is idealistic. Part of our 
human nature is that we are shapers of our own history and we need to take conscious 
responsibility for changing .our relation with nature. This is not just about individuals 
changing their attitudes within existing social relations. It is about seeking to 
transform the social relations that define our attitudes and behaviour. This requires a 
collective political and social effort that embraces the necessity for developing 
ecological wisdom. 
• These theoretical propositions can only have real meamng if they connect with 
concrete experiences of struggle and engagement within human society about how we 
relate to nature. The connection, I argue lies in the challenge posed by the diverse 
contemporary struggles for environmental justice to capitalist social relations and to 
the dominant discourses of environmentalism. At the centre of their potential lies 
their redefinition of the environment and of environmentalism. In contrast to the 
human/nature dualism that the alienated perspectives of mainstream 
environmentalism express, the struggle for environmental justice approaches the 
environment as a human experience that holistically integrates our relationship with 
nature into social relations. As Di Chiro argues: 
The environmental justice movement, in challenging mainstream 
environmentalism argues that an effective movement must integrate, not 











environments .. (It offers) a framework that insists on making linkages among the 
multiple aspects of the ecosystem, including the biophysical environment, the 
built environment, and the social environment. . . Ideas of nature, for 
environmental justice groups, are therefore tied closely to ideas of community, 
history, ethnic identity, and cultural survival, which include relationships to the 
land that express particular ways of life... Communities and environments are 
therefore conjoined and must be understood as being mutually constitutive (Di 
Chiro, 1995: 318). 
These propositions, I argue, establish a thread between the philosophical perspective 
offered by dialectical materialism on human·nature relations and the holistic perspective 
on social and environmental change that is actually and potentially offered by struggles 
for environmental justice across the world. However, it is important to identify more 
specifically the objective and subjective conditions in working class experience out of 
which the general potential of the environmental justice perspective can take shape. 
7.3 THE POTENTIAL OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE 
One of the most important propositions of dialectical materialism is that any reality 
expresses a process that contains contradictory elements - elements that exist in a 
dynamic and therefore potentially changing relationship with one another (Harvey, 1996: 
56). Alongside the extreme alienation facing working class and oppressed people in their 
relationship to their environment, and to nature as a whole, lies a progressive potential 
that does' not exist amongst the more environmentally-aware middle class. 
Whether and how that potential is expressed and realised as the possibility for 
transforming our human social relations and our relation to our environment, is 











purposeful action for change - through a reflexive process of organisatio~ educatio~ and 
mobilisation - that connects with and seeks to affect the existing reality of struggle, need, 
hope, and despair that fills the lives of the majority of humanity. In order to guide that 
process it is important to identify the dialectical points of tension within working class 
environmental experience - i.e. the tension between a lived experience of alienation on 
the one hand, and the creative potential to challenge that alienation on the other. In this 
regard I suggest the following. 
• In his research among urban African-Americans, Carl Anthony uses "eco-
psychology"to explore how people's relation to their environment is central to the 
formation of their identity (Di Chiro, 1995: 313). He argues that their life experience 
embraces a strong sense of alienatio~ of being "detached from any sense of place", 
and that living in impoverished polluted environments breeds a disabling sense of 
despair and hopelessness (Di Chiro, 1995: 313). Anthony argues however, that it is 
precisely this same alienating experience, as a collective experience, that often works 
to stimulate and mobilise people into a community activism in order to try and 
change their situation (Di Chiro, 1995: 314). 
• Connected to this potential is the fact that for working class people immediate 
environmental problems are issues of urgent need - often questions of very basic 
survival and well being. The black working class majority in South Africa for 
example, have historically experienced an extremely poor quality of life. Their reality 
gives them an enormous capacity to struggle for better living and working conditions. 
The direct link that exists between impoverished people and their environment does 
not exist in the same urgent conscious way for the middle and affluent classes (Cock, 
1991; Crompton and Erwi~ 1991). As Sachs argues: 
Questions of the environment enter far more pressingly into the lives of the poor 
than they do into the lives of the rich. The rich take sanitation and domestic 











frequently inaccessible, often unclean. They lack latrines. They have to collect 
. ftrewood for heat. They are the main victims of drought and flood, of lightening 
and tornadoes (Sachs, 1990: 4). 
• Workers have a particular role to play in expressing and articulating the intensity of 
their environmental experience. It is at the "conversion points" of production in 
industry and in agriculture and in providing basic services to society, that our human 
engagement with nature is most signiftcant and immediate (Crompton and Erwin, 
1991: 80). This is where the issues of health, safety, and environmental impact are 
most clearly focused and offer clear opportunities for collective action to transform 
human and· ecological abuse. 
• The distance that is commonly identified between the basic survival needs and 
priorities of impoverished people and their potential to develop a broader 
environmental awareness, is not as great as is often assumed. To understand this, we 
must approach environmental issues not fro~ the starting point of "green issues" but 
from the "brown issues" that impact on people's quality of life at work and at home-
water provision, sanitation, housing, open spaces, and pollution (McDonald, 1994: 
73). It is through these immediate brown issues that more distant green issues can be 
opened up and confronted 
• The experience of struggle around immediate environmental issues has the potential 
to expand itself through its own process of engagement and learning as it challenges 
the status quo and in doing so suggests new broader possibilities of struggle. The 
struggle of workers at the Thor chemical plant in Kwazulu-Natal against the impact 
on their health of exposure to mercury waste, drew workers and community members 
into a broader campaign against the international trade in toxic waste (Crompton and 
Erwin, 1991: 83). What began as an immediate survival issue grew, through an 
expansive politicising experience, into a wider struggle for social justice. As Peet and 
Watts argue, 
environmental crises do not project truth into consciousness, on the basis of which 











environmental problems are one main source stimulating a series of creative 
reactions which mayor may not emerge as fully formed social movements ... as 
well as being practical struggles over livelihood and survival, they contest the 
'truths', imaginations, and discourses through which people think, speak about, 
and experience systems oflivelihood (Peet and Watts, 1996: 37). 
• The struggles of working class communities around living and working conditions 
take place within a broader lived experience of need, hope, and struggle. Struggle is a 
process which all the time draws on the past and looks to the future. The black 
majority in South Africa has a long tradition of struggle which at times embraced a 
radical vision for the future. It is that capacity to challenge the status quo which is 
unique to the dispossessed and that enables them to give full radical expression to 
their need for change. However environmentally-aware the affiuent sections of 
society are, their capacity to envisage new social relations and collective ways of 
relating to our environment will always be compromised by their defence of their 
material interest in maintaining existing class relations and inequalities. 
It is with these progressive possibilities, contained within the social and environmental 
experiences of working class and poor communities, that organisational and educational 
praxisiV needs to connect in order to facilitate the development of environmental justice 
struggles. Probably the biggest challenge facing that development is for local struggles to 
transcend their specific and immediate concerns. It is to a discussion of that challenge 











7.4 THE CHALLENGES FACING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRUGGLES 
The extent to which local struggles for environmental justice can impact at any regional, 
national, or global level, will be determined by their ability to transform themselves from 
their militant particularism into a more universal project. The emergence of the 
Environmental Justice Movement in South Africa as a co-ordinating structure and 
instrument of advocacy is an important development in this regard. In the United States 
the extensive experience of struggle against the location of waste dumps near working 
class and minority communities has shifted people's protest from "not-in-my-backyard" 
to "not-in-anybodY's-backyard", giving evidence of a expanding environmental 
awareness and social concern (Harvey, 1996: 391). There are three connected 
. components to this challenge to lift environmental justice struggles out of their 
immediacy. 
Firstly, struggles for environmental justice need to find a way of transforming their 
spontaneous parochial nature into something more universal and enduring. Earlier in this 
chapter I argued the need for the development of a grand narrative and collective project 
that can challenge global capitalism and global environmental problems. 
Secondly, it is not automatic that any defence of livelihood is environmentally sound. 
Environmental justice struggles need to engage with contemporary scientific and 
philosophical understandings that promote ecological wisdom. The fact that what is good 
for nature in a specific instance may not be good for a human community is a real tension 











however, can only effectively be resolved when the cause of environmental protection is 
not knitted together with the political and economic interests of an oppressive minority. It 
is also important that the experience, knowledge, and concerns of an immediate 
. livelihood struggle engage with contemporary scientific and philosophical understandings 
that promote ecological wisdom. This is the dialogue that is needed between human 
interests and environmental sensitivity. As Raila and Levins argue: 
The solutions of the complex problems of society and nature depend on a 
combination of the intimate knowledge people have from their own experience 
and the scientific knowledge that requires some distance from the particular. The 
heterogeneity of nature demands sensitivity to the particular; and its global 
interconnectedness requires understanding of the whole (Raila and Levins, 1992: 
252). 
The third challenge facing struggles for environmental justice is to broaden their 
perspective on the environment. What is progressive is the fact that they take humans-in-
the-environment as a starting point and their assertion that urban life is as much 
environmental as wilderness. What is uncertain however, is the perspective that any 
localised environmental justice struggle might have on the nature that lies beyond its 
immediate experience. The fact that an urban working class community might protest 
against the location of a waste site on its doorstep does not automatically suggest any 
concern for wider environmental problems. 
In addressing these challenges what is needed is a dialectical engagement between the 
local and the universal, between difference and commonality, and between immediate 
experience and a broader philosophy and science, as the basis for a project that seeks to 











argument in this thesis is that it is only through establishing economic and social justice 
and equality within human society that we can develop an ecologically respectful relation 
to nature. 
This perspective is based on a recognition that inasmuch as we are natural-beings and 
dependent on nature, so nature is affected and shaped by our social relations. As long as 
our social relations are based on inequality and socio-economic injustice we will continue 
to abuse nature. As long as we remain alienated from one another socially, we will be 
alienated from the full potential of our human nature and therefore from nature as welL 
We cannot transform our relation to nature on the basis of capitalist economic and social 
relations as technocentrism would have it. Neither can we look to nature as a moral 
authority to correct our social defects as ecocentrism argues. Only by overcoming the 
human/nature dualism that pervades so much of contemporary environmental thought, 
can we tum our intimate relationship with nature into a creative dynamic of mutual 











Notes to Chapter 7 
i This is an elaboration of the dialectical themes outlined in Chapter 2.1 
ii Deep ecology argues the need for small scale, non:-hierarchical, harmonious 
communities that are bioregionally oriented and ecologically sound (Zimmerman, 
1994:6). There is nothing wrong with this as a normative vision. A problem arises 
however in their assumption that such an eventuality can arise organically out of our 
present conflictual, exploitative, oppressive, and environmentally destructive social 
relations. Those social relations emerged historically through conscious political struggle 
and they need to be challenged through an equally self-conscious human process. The 
path to harmony is therefore full of conflict, as in any transformation or growth process. 
iii The argument from Chinese philosophy that harmony is a defining characteristic of the 
cosmos is not a romantic assertion about nature or human society, nor is it a prescription 
against conflict and violence. It is rather a description of nature's processes - that nature 
tends towards union rather than disunion, integration rather than disintegration, synthesis 
rather than separation, and that these growth processes embrace conflict and tension 
(Wei-Ming, 1989: 72). 
tV Praxis is activity and practice in the world, that embraces reflection on that experience 












It was late morning when we met for breakfast at a diner on the eastern edge of the Rocky 
Mountains, just an hour's drive from Boulder, Colorado. The winter air was dry and thin 
and the sun peered down over the Ponderosa pines and shone through the leafless silver-
trunked aspens. It bounced brightly off the gleaming sides of pick-up trucks on the 
roadside. I asked DemUs how his work was going. 
I'm out of work. I walked off the job after Jeff and I had a fight. I was so angry it 
was like I was outside of myself - y'know how it can be. What happened was we 
were building these houses see, out of recycled materials, like the walls made of 
old tyres that we put around a floor of concrete. So Jeff admires his work and says 
it is pristine nature. But I say 'How can it be pristine with all this concrete we're 
throwing?' I mean we've been throwing concrete allover the world - how can we 
call it pristine? So we got into this big fight, because Jeff, he takes concrete kinda 
personal. 
We got to talking about how people see nature differently, how it's often a cultural or 
class thing, and how women and men, doing different work, might connect in different 
ways to their environment. We traced the deep lines of violence and abuse that scar our 
troubled lands and how the indigenous people of North America and South Africa were 
swept aside by settler frontier expansion. We agreed that civilisation - the taming of the 
'wilderness' and the 'savage' - involved the conquest of one concept of natUre over 
another. We spoke about how the collective use of the land and other natural resources 
had been displaced by private ownership and its partner, dispossession. We discussed 
how the notion of private property - things to be owned, sold, bought, utilised or 
managed - framed our picture of nature today, and was the root of most of our 











We also spoke about how things could be different. We were children of the 1960's who 
had not given up our dreams of a better world through the thirty-year arc into the world 
of neo-liberalism. We shook hands warmly over the remains of our breakfast and 
aknowledged that it is good to remember that the private ownership of nature is a social 
construct, a cultural curiosity, that, for the greatest part of human history, has been an 
inconceivable notion. 
As Barbara Kingsolver asserts: 
Ownership is an entirely human construct. At some point people got along 
without it ... to own land, plants, other animals, more stuff than we need - that is 
the peculiar product of a modem imagination (Kingsolver, 1995: 26). 
And, lest we think that history has run its course, let us note the hopeful words of the 19th 
century Marxist philosopher and activist, Friederich Engels: 
The time which has passed since civilisation began is but a fragment of the past 
duration of human existence; and but a fragment of the ages yet to come ... A mere 
property career is not the final destiny of humankind (Engels, quoted in 
Kingsolver, 1995: 33). 
The development of private property relations as a way of relating to our environment ~s 
turned nature into a commodity, and with the estrangement that this implies, has reduced 
human beings to a shadow of their full potentiaL Our reduction of nature to a utilitarian 
means is not only an abuse of other forms of life but is also an expression of our own 
impoverishment. We need to cultivate an ethics, suggested both by the Taoist notion of 











"man's inorganic body" (McLellan, 1977: 81), that sees our natural environment as an 
extension of ourselves and that appreciates that it is only through that continuum that our 
human potential finds its full expression. 
I have argued in this thesis that our conception of nature is a profoundly human 
construction loaded with all kinds of cultural, class, and gender values. This is not to 
deny the objective reality of the flux of life-processes that surround us, but rather to 
challenge the assumption that the ways in which we represent that reality are natural and 
uncomplicated. Marx's dialectical materialism offers us a way of critically understanding 
human knowledge as a dynamic approximation of truth, rolling in the cusp between 
objective reality and our subjective appreciation of it. 
If we consciously embrace our human ability to give shape to our relation to nature as a 
natural expression of the life force (or chii ) that manifests itself through human nature, 
then we can use that capacity to work in sympathy with ecological processes rather than 
against them. Just as we have used our human skills to self-consciously stand apart from 
our environment in order to commodify nature and alienate ourselves from it, so we can 
act to develop a more integrated and ecologically-sound relation to our natural 
environment. This requires that we develop a vision that integrates collective human 
needs, aspirations, and values with an ecological wisdom. 
Marx understood the human species to be both part-of-nature and apart-from-nature. He 











nature is a dynamic one that expresses itself differently at different times in history. 
Marx's dialectical materialism offers us a way of understanding human-nature relations 
. as a process of change. This allows us to regard our present estrangement from nature as 
an historical and social construction and helps us to envisage a future beyond that 
alienated condition. In order to do this we need to explore the dynamics within human 
society that offer the potential for change. 
I have argued that it is in the lived experience of the dispossessed, impoverished, and 
oppressed majority of humankind that the potential for constructing a new, more 
humanised nature and naturalised humanity lies. This will not simply emerge 
spontaneously out of grassroots struggles for environmental justice but requires that a 
broader ethical, political, social, and ecological culture and vision find connection with 
those struggles. To realise our place ecologically - to develop a truly human sense of 
nature and a natural sense of humankind - requires a conscious political, social, and 











Notes to Conclusion 
i Chi is understood by Chinese wisdom to be the material-spiritua1life force energy that penneates all living 
things and processes. HU1lUU1S,. as the most sentient beings, are seen to e::\.-pre5schi in its highest fonn (Wie-
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